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1. INTRODUCTION
A mobile agent1 is a computer program
that acts autonomously on behalf of a user
and moves through a network of hetero-
geneous machines.2 Over the past years
and originally triggered to a large ex-
tend by the work on Telescript [White
1995], the field of mobile agents has at-
tracted considerable attention, and mo-
bile agent technology has been consid-
ered for a variety of applications [Chess
et al. 1995, 1998; Lange and Oshima 1999]
such as systems and network manage-
ment [Bieszczad et al. 1998], mobile com-
puting [Takashio et al. 2001], informa-
tion retrieval [Theilmann and Rothermel
2000], and e-commerce [Maes et al. 1999].
However, before mobile agent technology
can appear at the core of tomorrow’s busi-
ness applications, reliability mechanisms
for mobile agents have to be established.
Among these reliability mechanisms, fault
tolerance and transaction support are
mechanisms of considerable importance.
Currently, various approaches targeting
different application fields exist. Owing to
the respective strengths and weaknesses
of these approaches, it is often difficult
for the application developer to choose the
one best suited to a given application.
The article aims at structuring the field
of fault-tolerant and transactional mobile
agent execution and at examining the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of particular
approaches.
In the first part, the article presents
a survey of current approaches to fault-
tolerant mobile agent execution. It fo-
cuses on the algorithmic aspects; imple-
mentations of the current approaches are
not discussed. In this part, the crash
failure model is assumed, that is, com-
ponents such as agents, places (i.e., the
logical environment that executes the mo-
bile agent) and machines fail by prema-
1In the following, the term “agent” denotes a mobile
agent unless explicitly stated otherwise.
2So far, the mobile agent research community has
not agreed on a common definition for mobile agents.
Hence, various definitions exist. For the purpose of
this article, we adopt the definition given in Mattern
[1998] and Object Management Group (OMG) [2000].
turely halting their execution. We begin
by identifying the requirements for fault-
tolerant mobile agents: nonblocking and
exactly-once. The nonblocking property en-
sures that the failure of an infrastructure
component (e.g., a machine, place, agent,
or communication link) does not prevent
progress in the agent execution. A block-
ing execution is undesirable because it can
lead the agent owner to potentially wait
a long time for the return of the agent.
Replication prevents blocking, but may re-
sult in multiple executions of the agent.
The exactly-once property requires that
the code of an agent be executed exactly
once. This is particularly important for
operations with side effects, for example,
an agent withdrawing money from an ac-
count. Our survey proposes a novel classi-
fication of fault-tolerant mobile agent ap-
proaches. It is based on the time when the
modifications of the agent become perma-
nent and visible to other agents: commit-
after-stage vs. commit-at-destination. In
commit-after-stage approaches, the modi-
fications are permanent immediately after
the stage execution (i.e., after each execu-
tion step of the agent), whereas commit-at-
destination approaches only commit the
modifications when the agent has finished
its entire execution. Within these two ap-
proaches we further distinguish between
solutions where the agent and the commit
decision execute on multiple places and
those where they execute only on a single
place. We show how these characteristics
influence the exactly-once and nonblock-
ing properties.
In the second part, we present a survey
of transactional mobile agents. Transac-
tional mobile agents execute the mobile
agent transactionally. More specifically, a
transactional mobile agent execution en-
sures atomicity, consistency, isolation, and
durability (i.e., the so-called ACID proper-
ties [Ha¨rder and Reuter 1983; Gray and
Reuter 1993]). Assume, for instance, that
a mobile agent has to book (1) a flight from
Zurich to New York, (2) a hotel room, and
(3) a rental car in New York. Clearly, the
agent owner, that is, the person or appli-
cation creating and initializing the agent,
wants to have either all of (1), (2), and (3)
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or none at all. A rental car in New York,
for instance, is of limited use if no airline
ticket is available. Hence, the three op-
erations all have to succeed or otherwise
none of them should be executed. This all-
or-nothing property corresponds exactly to
the atomicity property of a transaction.
Note that this property is not ensured by
fault-tolerant mobile agent execution dis-
cussed in the first part of this article.
Similar to fault-tolerant mobile agent
execution, the non-blocking property is
also desirable for transactional mobile
agents. We show how approaches to fault-
tolerant mobile agent executions can help
to achieve nonblocking in a transactional
context. In particular, we discuss how the
commit-at-destination approach can be
extended to a transactional mobile agent
approach.
In the third part, we extend our fail-
ure model from crash failures to more
hostile environments, in which malicious
places can access and tamper with the mo-
bile agent’s state and code. More specif-
ically, the place may read confidential
data of the agent (e.g., the credit card in-
formation) or modify previously collected
data. We survey existing approaches and
show why this issue is still not adequately
resolved.
The rest of this survey is structured as
follows: Section 2 presents our model of
mobile agents. In Section 3, we specify
fault-tolerant mobile agent execution in
terms of two properties: nonblocking and
exactly-once. The basic building blocks to
ensure these properties are identified in
Section 4. Section 5 defines the charac-
teristics of fault-tolerant mobile agent ap-
proaches and provides a classification of
these approaches. A survey of existing ap-
proaches in terms of our classification is
given in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss
mechanisms to ensure execution atomic-
ity for transactional mobile agents and
we present a survey on the current ap-
proaches to transactional mobile agents
in Section 8. Section 9 contains the third
part of this survey: fault-tolerant mobile
agent execution in the context of malicious
places. Finally, Section 10 concludes this
article.
Fig. 1. Model of a mobile agent execution with four
stages.
2. MODEL
We assume an asynchronous distributed
system, that is, there are no bounds on
transmission delays nor on relative pro-
cessor speeds. An example of an asyn-
chronous system is the Internet. Proces-
sors communicate via message passing.
2.1. Mobile Agent
A mobile agent executes on a sequence
of machines, where a place3 pi (0 ≤ i ≤
n) provides the logical execution environ-
ment for the agent [White 1996]. Execut-
ing the agent at a place pi is called a stage
Si of the agent execution [Minsky et al.
1996]. We call the places where the first
and last stages of an agent execute (i.e.,
p0 and pn) the agent source and desti-
nation, respectively [Minsky et al. 1996].
The sequence of places between the agent
source and destination (i.e., p0, p1, . . . , pn)
is called the itinerary of a mobile agent.
Whereas a static itinerary is entirely de-
fined at the agent source and does not
change during the agent execution, a dy-
namic itinerary is subject to modifications
by the agent itself.
Logically, a mobile agent executes
in a sequence of stage actions (see
Figure 1). Each stage action sai con-
sists of potentially multiple operations
op0, op1, . . . . Agent ai (0 ≤ i ≤ n) at
the corresponding stage Si represents the
agent a that has executed the stage ac-
tions on places pj ( j < i) and is about to
execute on place pi. The execution of ai on
place pi results in a new internal state
of the agent as well as potentially a new
state of the place (if the operations of an
agent have side effects).4 We denote the
3Also called landing pad in Johansen et al. [1999].
4We assume that the mobile agent accesses only
resources that are local to the place.
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resulting agent ai+1. Place pi forwards ai+1
to pi+1 (for i < n).
In this article, we focus on the execu-
tion of a single agent. Hence, we denote
by agent execution the execution of a sin-
gle agent in a sequence of stages. The case
of multiple agents coordinating to solve
a higher-level task is briefly discussed in
Section 3.3.
2.2. Infrastructure Failures
Machines, places, or agents can fail and
subsequently recover. A component that
has failed but not yet recovered is called
down, whereas it is up otherwise. In this
article, we first focus on crash failures
(i.e., processes that halt prematurely). In
Section 9, we extend this view to also ac-
commodate malicious failures (i.e., Byzan-
tine failures) of places and security-
related issues. A failing place causes all
agents running on it to fail as well. Sim-
ilarly, a failing machine causes all places
and agents on this machine to fail as well.
We do not consider catastrophic failures
such as deterministic, repetitive program-
ming errors (i.e., programming errors that
occur on all agent replicas or places) in
the code or the place to be relevant fail-
ures in this context. In general, we call a
failure catastrophic if it violates our fail-
ure assumption. To address catastrophic
failures, Johansen et al. [1999] introduce
a so-called rally point. On detection of a
catastrophic failure, the agent is sent to
the rally point, where the agent owner can
debug it.
Finally, a link failure causes the loss of
the messages or agents currently in trans-
mission on this link. Failures of machines,
places, agents, and links are called infras-
tructure failures.
The detection of infrastructure crash
failures is generally encapsulated into
a failure detector module [Chandra and
Toueg 1996]. Failure detectors are de-
fined in terms of completeness and ac-
curacy properties. Completeness requires
that failed processes be eventually sus-
pected, whereas accuracy limits the num-
ber of false suspicions, that is, pro-
cesses that are suspected but have not
failed. In Chandra and Toueg [1996], the
authors introduce several types of fail-
ure detectors defined by completeness and
accuracy properties. Perfect failure de-
tectors, which eventually detect all fail-
ures (strong completeness) and make
no false suspicions (strong accuracy),
are unrealistic in the Internet. Hence,
assuming unreliable failure detectors—
that can make false suspicions—is a
more realistic assumption. S is an ex-
ample of an unreliable failure detector
[Chandra and Toueg 1996]: correct pro-
cesses can falsely be suspected, but even-
tually some correct process is no more
suspected.
2.3. Unfavorable Outcome
An unfavorable outcome is different from
an infrastructure failure in the sense that
neither machine, place, nor agent initiat-
ing the request fail. Rather, it occurs when
a requested service is not delivered be-
cause of the application logic or because
the service has failed. For instance, a re-
quest for an airline ticket is declined if no
seats are available on a particular flight.
Nevertheless in this case, the agent’s oper-
ation, that is, the request for a ticket, ex-
ecutes in its entirety (although no ticket
is issued). Actually, in this example no
real “failure” has occurred, as the result
is a valid outcome of the service. How-
ever, from the perspective of the agent (i.e.,
the client of the service), the outcome of
the service request is undesired. Hence,
we call this outcome an “unfavorable out-
come”. We assume that the request of a
mobile agent to a service always returns.
Therefore, an unfavorable outcome does
not include programming errors such as
infinite loops.
2.4. Transactional vs. Nontransactional
Mobile Agents
The execution of two stage actions sai and
sa j is atomic if and only if both stage
actions succeed or none at all. Atomic-
ity addresses both infrastructure failures
and unfavorable outcomes. Assume, for
instance, that stage action sai books a
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flight, whereas sa j reserves a hotel room
at the flight destination. Clearly, there is
no need for the hotel room if no seat is
available on any flight to the destination.
Hence, sai and sa j must execute atomi-
cally, that is, we want both to succeed.
If either one fails (because of an infras-
tructure failure or an unfavorable outcome
such as no seat being available) then the
other one has to be aborted as well. We call
these mobile agents transactional mobile
agents.
On the other hand, general fault-
tolerant mobile agent executions do not
require atomicity. Rather, they address in-
frastructure failures only and ignore un-
favorable outcomes. For instance, a mo-
bile agent execution that buys a book
(i.e., sak) and shoes (i.e., sal ) acquires the
book even if no shoes are available, or
vice versa. In this sense, sak and sal are
independent.
Note that nontransactional fault-
tolerant mobile agent executions can
be implemented using transactions
[Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin 1998;
Rothermel and Strasser 1998]. How-
ever, the use of transactions still does
not ensure atomicity in the entire mo-
bile agent execution. In other words,
our classification into “transactional”
and “nontransactional” executions is
related to the provided properties (e.g.,
atomicity), and not to the mechanisms
used in the implementation. To distin-
guish between the properties and the
mechanism, we refer to the properties
using the word “transactional”, whereas
we use “transaction” to refer to the
mechanism.
In the following, we first focus on non-
transactional mobile agents, that is, gen-
eral fault-tolerant mobile agent execution.
Transactional mobile agents are discussed
in Section 7.
3. SPECIFICATION OF FAULT-TOLERANT
MOBILE AGENT EXECUTION
In this section, we specify the desired
fault-tolerant mobile agent execution in
terms of two properties: nonblocking and
exactly-once execution.
3.1. Infrastructure Failures and the
Blocking Problem
While a mobile agent is executing on a
place pi, an infrastructure failure of pi
might interrupt the execution of ai and
prevent any progress of the mobile agent
execution. During the time pi is down, the
execution of ai and consequently the entire
mobile agent execution cannot proceed.
We say that the execution of ai is blocked.
Provided the availability of suitable recov-
ery mechanisms, the execution of ai on pi
proceeds when pi recovers from the fail-
ure. Generally, a mobile agent execution is
called blocking if a single failure renders
progress in the mobile agent execution im-
possible until the failed component (e.g.,
machine, place, agent, or communication
link) recovers. In contrast, a nonblocking
mobile agent execution can continue the
execution despite a single failure. We gen-
eralize this definition to t-blocking, that
is, an approach blocks if t or more fail-
ures occur. Correspondingly, an approach
is t-nonblocking if it can sustain t failures
and still continue its execution. Hence, t in
t-nonblocking specifies the degree of non-
blocking. Unless explicitly defined other-
wise, we use blocking to refer to 1-blocking
or 0-nonblocking, and nonblocking to re-
fer to 1-nonblocking. Generally, blocking
mobile agent executions are undesired. In
particular, if the failed component does
not recover, then the agent is lost and
never returns to the agent owner. More-
over, long downtimes of components lead
to very long response times and may be un-
acceptable for the agent owner. Hence, mo-
bile agent executions are preferably non-
blocking. Note that unfavorable outcomes
(see Section 2.3) do not lead to blocking.
3.2. Agent Replication and the Exactly-Once
Execution Problem
3.2.1. Replication to Prevent Blocking.
Blocking can only be overcome by intro-
ducing redundancy. More specifically, if
a place fails, the agent is executed on
another place. However, redundancy of
execution may result in multiple exe-
cutions of (parts of) the mobile agent.
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Fig. 2. Agent execution with redundant places, where a place fails. The
redundant places mask the place failure.
While this is not a problem for idempotent
operations (e.g., operations without side
effects) it should not occur for nonidem-
potent operations. Take, for instance,
an agent that retrieves money from the
agent owner’s bank account. This is
clearly a nonidempotent operation and
multiple executions of this operation have
the undesired effect of multiple money re-
trievals. Therefore, nonidempotent stage
actions must be executed exactly-once
[Rothermel and Strasser 1998]. On the
other hand, operations such as reading
an account balance allow multiple execu-
tions. Clearly, blocking in a mobile agent
execution consisting only of idempotent
operations is easily prevented by sending
multiple agents.
The redundancy introduced by repli-
cation masks failures and ensures
progress of the mobile agent execution.
Figure 2 illustrates the replication
approach. At stage Si, a set of places
Mi = {p0i , p1i , p2i , . .} executes the agent ai.
Even if place p02 fails the agent a2 is not
lost, as the other places in M2 have also
received a2 and can start executing it.
Note that there is no need to replicate the
agent at the agent source and destination.
At the agent source, the agent is still
under the control of the agent owner. The
agent destination may be a mobile device,
that is connected only intermittently to
the network. Hence, mechanisms need
to be implemented to store the agent
until the mobile device connects again to
the network. As the agent only presents
the results to the agent owner at the
agent destination, which is generally an
idempotent operation, these mechanisms
at the same time also address failures at
the agent destination.
3.2.2. Properties of Places Mi . In
Section 3.2.1 we have introduced repli-
cation as a way to overcome the problem
of blocking. Replication occurs at the
agent level: the agent replicas execute
on different places pji ∈ Mi at a stage
Si. Depending on the relation among
these places, we distinguish among three
different classes of places: iso-places,
hetero-places, and hetero-places with wit-
nesses [Pleisch and Schiper 2000; Strasser
and Rothermel 1998]. Iso-places corre-
spond to the traditional case of server
replication: the set Mi consists of replica
places, where all places are provided by
the same company. Revisiting our airline
example, all places are provided by Swiss
International Air Lines: modifications to
one place are visible to the others as well.
Consequently, executing a fault-tolerant
mobile agent on iso-places leads to two
levels of replication: server replication in
the places (i.e., Swiss International Air
Lines’ servers) and client replication on
the agent level.
Within the class of iso-places, we can
further distinguish between places pji ,
where the modifications are propagated
(1) by the places themselves or (2) by the
agent replicas. In (1), called replicated iso-
places, the places run a replication pro-
tocol, which ensures consistency among
the place replicas. Note that executing the
mobile agent ai on two such iso-places in
Mi at stage Si causes all iso-places in Mi
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to reflect the modifications twice.5 In (2),
on the other hand, the agent replicas up-
date the iso-places in Mi. The mobile agent
thus ensures consistency of the replicas.
However, this requires that an instance
of the agent (i) execute on all replicas
and (ii) must not fail as long as the ser-
vice is up and running. We refer to this
case as independent iso-places.6 Indepen-
dent iso-places are assumed for instance in
[Schneider 1997].
Hetero-places correspond to a set Mi of
places (see Figure 2) that all provide a sim-
ilar service such as selling airline tickets
from Geneva to New York. However, the
places are provided by different airlines,
e.g., Swiss International Air Lines, Delta
Airlines, and Lufthansa.
Finally, hetero-places with witnesses
are a generalization of hetero-places.
Whereas hetero-places all provide the par-
ticular service (i.e., airline tickets from
Geneva to New York), in hetero-places
with witnesses only a subset of the places
provides the service. The others (i.e., the
witnesses), although they can execute the
agent, do not provide an airline ticket
service to the agent and thus the ser-
vice request of the agent fails. How-
ever, the agent is not lost and proceeds
with the execution, while potentially re-
porting the failed ticket acquisition to the
agent owner. In general, a witness is a
place that can execute the mobile agent
(e.g., provides a Java Virtual Machine ca-
pable of executing the mobile agent), but
does not provide the particular service re-
quired by the agent. Hence, the agent re-
quest to the service fails (for instance,
raises an exception that is caught by some
exception handler), but the agent can con-
tinue its execution despite an infrastruc-
ture failure of a place in Mi. Note that the
execution of an agent replica on a witness
generally results in an unfavorable out-
5This is true, unless a mechanism (e.g., transaction
IDs) is provided that prevents iso-places from execut-
ing the same operation twice. See Section 3.2.3 for a
discussion on multiple executions of mobile agents.
6In Pleisch and Schiper [2000], replicated iso-places
are called nonintegrated iso-places, whereas inde-
pendent iso-places are called integrated iso-places.
come, as the requested service is not in-
stalled on the witness place.
Approaches for fault-tolerant mobile
agent executions generally address
replicated7 iso-places, hetero-places, and
hetero-places with witnesses. Clearly, it is
desirable that the agent execute on only
one place per stage unless a failure occurs.
This allows a significant reduction of the
overhead and improves the performance
of the system.
Despite agent replication, network par-
titions can still prevent the progress of
the agent. Indeed, if the network is par-
titioned such that all places currently ex-
ecuting the agent at stage Si are in one
partition, and the places of stage Si+1 are
in another partition, then the agent can-
not proceed with its execution. Generally
(especially in the Internet) multiple rout-
ing paths are possible for a message to ar-
rive at its destination. Therefore, a link
failure may not always lead to network
partitioning.
In the following, we assume that a sin-
gle link failure merely partitions one place
from the rest of the network. Clearly, this
is a simplification, but it allows us to con-
cisely define blocking (see Section 3.1).
Moreover, catastrophic failures may
still cause the loss of the entire agent. A
failure of all places in M2 (see Figure 2),
for instance, is such a catastrophic failure.
As no copy of a2 is available any more, the
agent a2 is lost and, obviously, the agent
execution cannot proceed. In other words,
replication does not solve all problems. It
is important to keep this in mind.
3.2.3. Replication and the Exactly-Once Prob-
lem. Replication allows executions to be
nonblocking. However, it may also lead to
multiple agent executions. Assume, for in-
stance, that p0i fails (see Figure 3). Place
p1i starts executing ai, which results in
agent ai+1 and Mi+1. In the meantime, p0i
recovers and continues the execution of ai.
Clearly, this requires that the agent’s state
and code have been checkpointed to stable
storage upon arrival of the agent on p0i . If
7In the following, the term “iso-places” refers to repli-
cated iso-places unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Fig. 3. Replication potentially leads to a violation of the exactly-once
property.
p0i and p
1
i commit the agent’s stage action,
the agent is executed multiple times and
results in duplicate agents ai+1 and a′i+1.
Although blocking of the agent execution
because of a failure to pi is prevented, the
mechanism to prevent blocking results in
multiple agent executions. Consequently,
the problem of multiple agent executions
and blocking are related problems in the
sense that preventing blocking may lead
to multiple agent executions.
Another source of a violation of the
exactly-once execution property is unre-
liable failure detection. In asynchronous
systems, such as the Internet, it is im-
possible to detect failures correctly (see
Section 2.2). Even if a place pki suspects
the failure of another place pji (i.e., be-
lieves that pji has failed), p
j
i may not
have failed in reality. Indeed, slow com-
munication or processor speeds, or net-
work partitioning may have caused pki to
erroneously suspect pji . Therefore, when
place p1i suspects the failure of p
0
i , it starts
executing ai (see Figure 3). If the suspi-
cion of p1i was erroneous, the execution of
ai at stage Si results in two agents ai+1
and a′i+1; a violation to the exactly-once
property.
In summary, we require that a fault-
tolerant mobile agent execution satisfy the
following liveness and safety properties
[Alpern and Schneider 1985]:
t-Nonblocking. t failures must not pre-
vent the termination of the agent execu-
tion (liveness).
Exactly-once. The mobile agent’s stage
actions are executed exactly-once (safety).
3.3. Agent Coordination
So far, we have not discussed the case
of coordinating multiple agents to solve a
higher-level task. For instance, an agent
could split its task into subtasks and as-
sign them to new agents, called child
agents. Eventually, these child agents and
the parent agent meet again to share the
results. This case is more difficult to han-
dle than the case of a single mobile agent
execution and involves the creation of
child agent(s) and, later, the coordination
among them and the parent agent again.
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Fig. 4. Agent ai spawns a new agent b1 at stage
Si(a).
3.3.1. Spawning Child Agents. The agent
ai at stage Si can spawn a new agent b,
which causes two agents to be forwarded
by stage Si(a) (the identifier within the
parenthesis distinguishes the stages of
agent a from those of b): ai+1 and b1 (see
Figure 4). Assume, for instance, that the
execution of ai on place p0i has led to agent
b. If ai on p0i fails, then all its modifica-
tions have to be undone. In particular, the
spawned agent b has to be undone.
3.3.2. Rejoin. The agent b spawned by
agent a may rejoin agent a at a later stage
in a’s execution, say Sk(a) (k > i). In other
words, the agents a and b meet again at
stage Sk(a). Between the stage at which a
has created b and Sk(a), a and b may follow
different itineraries. As agent a is repli-
cated at stage Sk(a), a replica of agent b
must be received on every place in Mk(a)
as well.8 This ensures that no replica
agent a jk waits forever for the arrival
of agent b. Indeed, assume that a replica
of agent b only arrives on place p0k and
that this place fails. In this case, the other
replicas a1k and a
2
k still await the arrival
of b and thus the execution of a cannot
proceed. Clearly, agents a and b have
8Actually, it may be sufficient under certain condi-
tions that a majority of places in Mk(a) receive a
replica of b.
Fig. 5. Stage action of
agent ai runs as a local
transaction.
to agree on their meeting point, that is,
Mk(a).
4. BASIC BUILDING BLOCK: LOCAL
TRANSACTION
In Section 3.1 we have specified the fault-
tolerant mobile agent execution in terms
of the non-blocking and exactly-once prop-
erties. In this section, we define a basic
building block that is fundamental to en-
force the exactly-once property and thus
implicitly also the non-blocking property:
the local transaction.
4.1. Local Transaction
The stage action sai of mobile agent ai en-
compasses a set of operations op0, op1, . . . ,
that act on the local services (see Figure 5).
Locally, on the place pi, the agent executes
the set of operations, thereby transform-
ing a consistent state of the agent and
the place into another consistent state9
(consistency). The effects of executing sai
have to be durable, that is, reflected by the
place (new state of the place) as well as by
the agent ai+1, and not to be lost anymore
(durability). Moreover, we require that sai
execute entirely or not at all (atomicity).
Only when sai has completed its execution
should the results, including the modifica-
tions to the place, generated messages, or
spawned child agents, be visible to other
9The resulting agent is called ai+1 (see Section 2.1).
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agents (isolation). These four properties
correspond to the specification of an ACID
transaction. Hence, sai has to run trans-
actionally. This is ensured using a local
transaction to execute sai. The concept of
a local transaction is an important build-
ing block for fault-tolerant mobile agent
execution.
The local transaction consisting of oper-
ations op0, op1, . . . terminates either by a
commit or an abort decision. If the deci-
sion is to commit, the effects of executing
op0, op1, . . . become durable, otherwise, all
the modifications are undone. We classify
the approaches for fault-tolerant mobile
agent execution according to when and by
whom this commit/abort decision is taken
(see Section 5).
4.2. Enforcing Exactly-Once
Execution Property
Executing the stage action sai transac-
tionally is the basic mechanism allow-
ing us to enforce the exactly-once prop-
erty for mobile agent executions. Actually,
whereas the entire mobile agent is ex-
ecuted exactly-once, the local operations
op0, op1, . . . of a stage action are executed
at-most-once.
4.2.1. At-Most-Once Ensured on Place pi .
Failures during the execution of an
agent’s stage action sai potentially leave
the execution in an inconsistent state.
More specifically, some of the operations
op0, op1, . . . that correspond to the stage
action may have been executed, whereas
others have not. The agent ai as well as
the place (or rather, its services) are thus
in an incorrect, transitory state. Executing
sai transactionally prevents such incon-
sistent states, as either all the operations
op0, op1, . . . are executed or none at all.
4.2.2. Exactly-Once for the Entire Mobile
Agent Execution. In Section 3.2, we have
shown how replication can prevent block-
ing. Replication may lead to multiple ex-
ecutions of a stage action sai on different
places pji and p
k
i . To prevent a violation to
the exactly-once execution property, only
one of the executions must be committed,
whereas the other(s) have to be aborted.
This is why stage actions are executed
exactly-once. In Figure 3, for instance,
the execution of ai on place p0i has to be
aborted, whereas the execution of ai on
p1i is committed. Running the stage exe-
cutions as local transactions allows us, by
controlling the commit/abort decision, to
enforce the exactly-once property.
Note that terminating local transac-
tions at stage Si (i.e., issuing either abort
or commit) requires that the place running
the local transaction eventually recover
from a failure and that potential link fail-
ures (i.e., network partitions) be resolved.
However, such a link failure or place fail-
ure should not prevent the continuation of
the agent execution, that is, they should
not lead to blocking.
4.3. Handling Isolation of Local Transactions
Local transactions related to the exe-
cution of some agent can either make
their results immediately visible to other
mobile agents, or they only make the re-
sults visible when the outcome of the mo-
bile agent execution is known. The for-
mer local transactions are called open
local transactions, while the latter are
closed local transactions. Undoing open lo-
cal transactions related to the execution of
some agent a potentially requires one to
undo the operations of other agents that
have used a’s results in their computa-
tions, thus resulting in cascading undo
operations. In practice, this is generally
avoided. In the context of mobile agents,
an open local transaction is immediately
committed after its execution. If at a later
stage this local transaction has to be
undone, a so-called compensating trans-
action [Gray 1981; Korth et al. 1990;
Garcia-Molina and Salem 1987] is run,
which semantically undoes the effects of
the corresponding local transaction. How-
ever, compensating transactions are not
always possible. For instance, operations
that send a message, print a check, or
launch a rocket generally cannot be com-
pensated. Moreover, if the local trans-
action has spawned a child agent (see
Section 3.3.1), then this child agent may
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already have moved off. Hence, another
agent has to be sent after this child
agent to compensate all its activities.
This requires that the compensating agent
can deterministically recompute the ex-
act itinerary of the original agent, and
that all actions of the child agent are
also compensatable. Note that sending an
undo message to the child agent to trig-
ger its rollback is not always success-
ful either. Indeed, a slow undo message
may never reach a fast-moving mobile
agent, causing the undo to be delayed and
increasing dependencies.10 In summary,
open local transactions are only suited for
particular applications in a mobile agent
environment.
In contrast, closed local transactions
make their results only visible to other mo-
bile agents when the outcome of the mobile
agent execution is known, that is, when it
is ensured that the local transaction will
not be undone any more. Until the local
transaction is committed, other agents can
generally not access the data items that
are accessed by the local transaction. As-
sume, for instance, that the local transac-
tion uses a pessimistic concurrency control
scheme based on locking. Any other agent
can only access the locked data items when
the local transaction commits and releases
the locks on the data items. Besides lock-
ing, multiple concurrency control schemes
exist. The reader is referred to Weikum
and Vossens [2002] for an overview on ex-
isting concurrency control schemes.
5. CLASSIFICATION OF FAULT-TOLERANT
MOBILE AGENT APPROACHES
In Section 4, we have identified the lo-
cal transaction as the basic building block
for fault-tolerant mobile agent execution
(i.e., for addressing infrastructure fail-
ures). The stage actions of the mobile
agent are executed as local transactions.
Once the operations of the stage action
are executed, the local transaction is ei-
10Murphy and Picco [1999] provide an approach to
ensure reliable message delivery to an agent. How-
ever, this approach only works in an environment
without failures and at a considerable cost.
ther committed or aborted. We call this
decision about which local transaction of
a given stage to commit and which local
transaction to abort the commit decision.
This commit decision can happen at differ-
ent moments in the execution of the mo-
bile agent: (1) at the end of the stage exe-
cution (called commit-after-stage), or (2) at
the end of the mobile agent execution, that
is, at the agent destination (called commit-
at-destination). Whereas in case (2), this
decision is only made once for the entire
mobile agent execution, case (1) requires
one decision for every intermediate stage.
We first discuss the commit-after-stage
and commit-at-destination cases in detail
in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, and then compare
them in Section 5.3.
5.1. Commit-After-Stage Approaches
The commit-after-stage approaches com-
mit the stage actions at the end of ev-
ery stage Si before the agent moves to
the next stage Si+1. The commit is of
particular importance if the mobile agent
execution is replicated at stage Si (see
Figure 2). More specifically, the commit de-
cision prevents multiple executions of the
agent and thus ensures the exactly-once
property. In this context, we need to dis-
tinguish between two cases: the execution
of ai (1) on a single place (i.e., a nonrepli-
cated agent execution) and (2) on a set of
places Mi (that is, a replicated agent exe-
cution). Moreover, the commit decision can
be made by a single place or it can be dis-
tributed, that is, the decision can be made
by multiple places. Finally, the commit de-
cision can be collocated with the execution
of ai or not. Combinations of these three
criteria lead to eight solutions, which can
be represented in a three dimensional
space (see Figure 6): (1) location of the
agent execution, (2) location of the commit
decision, (3) collocated/distributed.
In Section 3, we have shown how block-
ing can occur in the agent execution.
Blocking also occurs in the commit deci-
sion. In particular, if the commit decision
is made by only a single place, there is a
risk of blocking or violating the exactly-
once execution property to the mobile
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Fig. 6. Classification of fault-tolerant mobile agent
approaches along three axes: (x) location of the agent
execution, (y) location of the commit decision, and (z)
collocated or distributed.
agent execution. For instance, in a two-
phase commit (2PC) protocol, blocking
occurs if the coordinator fails at a cer-
tain point in the protocol [Bernstein et al.
1987]. Moreover, network partitions may
also prevent progress in the commit de-
cision. Some protocols implementing the
commit decision require the participation
of a majority of places to reach a deci-
sion. However, the network may partition
in such a way that no partition contains a
majority of places and thus the commit de-
cision protocols can only terminate when
the partitions are merged again. We dis-
cuss now all eight solutions.
5.1.1. Single/Single/Collocated—SSC. The
SSC solution encompasses the approaches
where the stage action of an agent exe-
cutes on a single place pi, commits, and
then the agent moves to the next place
pi+1. In other words, both the execu-
tion of the stage action and the commit
decision occur on the same place (see
Figure 7(a)). Actually, the outcome of the
commit decision is always commit; abort
is never decided, as there is no reason
from the perspective of pi to abort the
agent execution. However, a failure of pi
causes blocking of the agent execution
(see Figure 8). The SSC solution is thus
1-blocking. Moreover, if pi does not re-
cover, the agent (i.e., its code and state)
is lost. Interestingly, the loss of the agent
also leads to blocking, as the agent owner
awaits the return of the agent. The use
of standard logging and checkpointing
mechanisms [Gray and Reuter 1993] for
the state and code of the agent on the
current place prevents the loss of the
agent. However, it is still a blocking ap-
proach, as a failing place causes blocking
of the mobile agent execution. Progress
of the agent execution is only possible
again when the failed place recovers. The
recovering place thereby uses the latest
local checkpoint to recover the agent ai.
A SSC solution is most suited to en-
vironments in which failures are rare or
where blocking is not a problem, either be-
cause of the nature of the application or be-
cause failed components recover quickly.
The exactly-once execution property is en-
sured if a suitable recovery mechanism is
used. Moreover, the agent must execute
on a particular place in some applications.
For instance, an agent that increments the
value of a configuration parameter on a
set of network switches must visit these
switches. As network switches rarely fail
(if they do, they are restarted quickly),
paying the overhead of replication may not
be appropriate in this context.
In SSC solutions based on checkpoint-
ing, the loss of the agent is generally pre-
vented even in case of catastrophic fail-
ures. Both single and catastrophic failures
prevent the progress of the agent, but the
agent’s code and state are preserved.
5.1.2. Single/Multiple/Collocated—SMC.
Similar to the SSC solution, the stage
action of the agent ai is executed on
one place pi only. The commit deci-
sion, on the other hand, is distributed
over multiple places (see Figure 7(b)).
Consequently, a failure of pi leads to
blocking of the mobile agent execution.
On the other hand, the commit decision
is nonblocking, as it is distributed. The
degree of non-blocking thereby is either
constant or depends on the number of
replicas that participate in the commit.
It seems strange to distribute the commit
decision, whereas the execution happens
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Fig. 7. Four solutions of collocated commits. E and C specify the places involved
in the agent execution and the commit decision, respectively.
Fig. 8. Agent execution where place pi
fails while executing ai . While pi is down,
the execution of ai is blocked.
on a single place. Thus, the SMC solution
has not been discussed in the literature.11
5.1.3. Multiple/Single/Collocated—MSC.
The stage action of agent ai is executed
by multiple places, whereas the commit
decision is made by a single place pki (see
Figure 7c). Revisiting Figure 3, p0i , p
1
i ,
and p2i execute the agent, while p
2
i , for
instance, executes the commit protocol.
In the MSC solution, the commit decision
determines the place that has executed
the agent, called primary and denoted
pprimi . All other places p
j
i = pprimi abort
all the modifications of ai. For instance,
p2i decides that p
1
i can commit the agent’s
operations, whereas p0i and p
2
i must abort
them (if ai has started execution on this
particular place). This prevents multiple
executions of ai and thus a violation to
the exactly-once property.
Although the execution of the stage ac-
tion is non-blocking, blocking may occur
in the commit protocol. This is because
a single place executes the commit pro-
11The SMC solution may be applicable for scenarios
where a mobile agent has to execute on very specific
places. For example, the agent owner may want to fly
only with Swiss International Air Lines, which only
supports a non-replicated service.
tocol. If this place fails, the commit de-
cision blocks and thus the entire mobile
agent execution is blocked. Consequently,
MSC solutions decrease the probability of
blocking compared to SSC solutions. This
is especially true as the execution time
for the commit decision is generally much
shorter than the time needed for the agent
execution.
Moreover, MSC solutions have practi-
cal relevance in environments where some
places rarely fail. The commit decision can
be executed on these places to reduce the
probability of blocking.
5.1.4. Multiple/Multiple/Collocated—MMC.
The MMC solution is a generalization
of the solutions where the execution of
the stage action and the commit decision
are collocated. In other words, both the
execution and the commit decision are
distributed over multiple places (see
Figure 7(d)). This distribution avoids
blocking, but leads to the danger of
violating the exactly-once execution
property. To preserve the exactly-once
property, the places that have executed
the agent need to agree on the primary
pprimi that commits the modifications
performed by the agent while all other
places abort them. In other words, un-
less an agreement is reached, that is,
unless a so-called agreement problem
is solved, among these places, multiple
executions of the mobile agent cannot be
prevented.
This solution makes the fewest assump-
tions about the environment. The over-
head added by replication only makes
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 2004.
232 S. Pleisch and A. Schiper
Fig. 9. Two solutions of distributed commits by place pk . E and C specify the
places involved in the agent execution and the commit decision, respectively.
Fig. 10. Two solutions of distributed commits by multiple places. E and C
specify the places involved in the agent execution and the commit decision,
respectively.
sense for applications that have strin-
gent requirements regarding fault toler-
ance and nonblocking, such as e-commerce
applications.
5.1.5. Single/Single/Distributed—SSD. The
SSD solution corresponds to SSC, except
that the execution of the agent and
the commit decision are not collocated
(see Figure 9(a)). In other words, the
place that executes the agent and the
place that makes the commit decision
are not the same. More specifically, any
place pk can make the commit decision,
which then has to be communicated to
pi. This communication is prone to link
failures. Moreover, the separation of the
execution of ai and the commit decision
actually weakens the fault tolerance of
the agent execution. Indeed, the probabil-
ity that pi and pk do not fail is smaller
than the probability that pi does not
fail. Consequently, the probability of
blocking is higher, and this solution is less
interesting than SSC.
To our knowledge, the SSD approach
has not been implemented. However, we
show below that this solution is of con-
siderable interest to transactional mobile
agents (see Section 7).
5.1.6. Single/Multiple/Distributed—SMD.
This solution is similar to SMC and is
not discussed further. It is depicted in
Figure 10(a).
5.1.7. Multiple/Single/Distributed—MSD. A
set of places executes the stage action of
ai, whereas the commit decision is located
on any single place pk (see Figure 9(b)).
The execution of the stage action is
non-blocking, but the commit decision
can block. Failures in the communication
channel between pk and the places that
execute the stage action of ai may also
lead to blocking.
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Fig. 11. Local transactions are only committed when the agent arrives at the agent
destination. In this example, we assume pessimistic concurrency control.
5.1.8. Multiple/Multiple/Distributed—MMD.
To circumvent the problem of blocking,
both the execution of the stage action
of ai as well as the commit decision are
distributed to a disjoint set of places (see
Figure 10(b)). The main difference to
MMC is that MMC can exploit the locality
of commit decision and the execution of
ai. Moreover, MMC does not suffer from
communication failures (i.e., network par-
titioning) between the places executing
the stage action (i.e., pji ) and the places
executing the commit protocol (i.e., pjk ).
5.2. Commit-At-Destination Approaches
In contrast to commit-after-stage ap-
proaches, the stage actions of the mo-
bile agent are only committed at the
end of the agent execution. Whereas in
commit-after-stage approaches duplicate
agents are detected and discarded at each
stage, duplicates continue their execution
in commit-at-destination approaches. Du-
plicates can only be detected at a common
place, where they and the original agent
meet. Generally, only the agent destina-
tion is such a common place, because dy-
namic itineraries may be different for the
original agent and among the duplicates.
Hence, the agent destination is the only
place where a correct decision about which
agent (original or duplicates) to commit
and which to discard is possible. Usu-
ally, the first arriving agent is committed,
whereas the later arriving agent(s) are
aborted and their stage actions undone.
This allows us to ensure the exactly-once
property for fault-tolerant mobile agent
execution.
Until the agent has reached the agent
destination, the local transactions are not
committed/aborted. Rather, they are kept
unterminated until the outcome of the
agent execution is determined. Indeed, at
the moment of executing stage action sai
of agent a it is not clear whether a is com-
mitted or whether a duplicate agent will
arrive first at the agent destination and a
thus needs to be aborted. With closed local
transactions (see Section 4.3), data items
that are accessed by the mobile agent a are
generally only accessible to another agent
b when the corresponding local transac-
tion is committed. During this time, b has
to wait until the data items become avail-
able. Committing the agent’s stage actions
only at the agent destination makes all
data accessed data items only available
when agent a arrives at the agent destina-
tion. As other agents have to wait before
accessing the data items until a finishes
its execution, overall system throughput
is seriously reduced. Moreover, this ap-
proach requires sending additional mes-
sages to all places of the itinerary to either
commit or abort the stage actions once the
agent has arrived at its destination (see
Figure 11).
Liberating data items only when the
agent has reached the agent destination
and the sequential access to the data items
of different stages may lead to deadlocks.
Deadlocks can be handled by waiting for
data items only for a limited time. If a
timeout occurs, a deadlock is assumed and
the agents back off. If other places with
similar services are available, they may
try those, or otherwise retry the same
service. Although this approach does not
completely rule out livelocks, their proba-
bility can be made sufficiently small.
As discussed in Section 4.3, some appli-
cations allow open local transactions. Us-
ing this approach, data items are made
available to other agents immediately
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 2004.
234 S. Pleisch and A. Schiper
Fig. 12. At the agent destination, a compensation agent ca is created that runs the
compensating transactions.
after stage execution. Revisiting the ex-
ample in Figure 11, the compensating
transactions are run in the inverse order of
the agent execution (i.e., on p3, p2, . . . , p0).
Indeed, executing sai followed by the
corresponding compensating transaction
may result in an agent different from ai.
Assume, for instance, that sai buys a book
using e-cash [Strasser and Rothermel
2000]. Undoing this local transaction
means to return the book and be reim-
bursed the amount paid, potentially less
some penalty. As the change of the agent’s
state may also have an impact on the com-
pensation of stage Si−1, the inverse order
is necessary. Note that if the agent state
is the same for every stage as before ex-
ecuting the stage action, then compensa-
tion may run in parallel. To execute the
compensating transactions, compensating
agent ca is created (see Figure 12). Re-
call that not all applications can be com-
pensated (see Section 4.3). Although feasi-
ble, compensation may also be unsuitable
because of unacceptable run-time costs.
This is especially true in environments
with frequent false failure detections. In-
deed, the use of compensation transac-
tions makes an abort very expensive.
We classify the approaches similar to
Section 5.1, but focus on the only two
meaningful classes: SSD and MSD.
5.2.1. Single/Single/Distributed—SSD.
This solution is similar to the SSD solu-
tion for commit-after-stage approaches,
except that the commit decision occurs
only at the agent destination for all stage
actions (see Figure 11). It is blocking, but,
on the other hand, also prevents duplicate
agents. Clearly, the SSD commit-at-
destination solution is only of theoretical
interest. As the commit decision is always
commit, the local transactions could be
committed immediately after the stage
execution (as in SSD commit-after-stage)
instead of waiting until the agent reaches
the agent destination. We present this
solution here because it clarifies the
difference between nontransactional and
transactional mobile agent execution
(Section 7.1).
5.2.2. Multiple/Single/Distributed—MSD.
Contrary to the SSD approach, blocking
is prevented by executing the agent on
multiple places, if necessary. Because
previous places already have a copy of
the agent, they generally take over once
the current place fails. More specifically,
while the agent is executing on place pi
at stage Si, its execution is monitored
by the previous place pi−1. In addition,
pi−1 maintains a copy of the agent ai.
If a failure occurs at the current place
pi, place pi−1 launches its copy of the
agent and sends it to another place p′i
(see Figure 13). Sending ai to p′i, however,
may lead to duplicate agents, especially
in the presence of unreliable failure
detection. Duplicates are only detected at
the agent destination, where the commit
decision is made. This allows to enforce
the exactly-once property to nonblocking
fault-tolerant mobile agent executions. In
Figure 14, duplicate agent a′ is undone,
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Fig. 13. Local transactions are only committed when the agent arrives at the
agent destination.
Fig. 14. Unreliable failure detection may lead to duplicate agents. They can
generally only be detected at the agent destination.
that is, its stage actions on p′i+2, . . . , p
′
i
are undone.
With open local transactions, compen-
sating transactions are run on the places
p′i+1 and p
′
i, when it recovers. Execut-
ing compensating transactions generally
modifies the state of the agent and the
place. However, compensating duplicate
agents must lead to the same state the
agent had on the place that erroneously
detected the failure. In Figure 14, the du-
plicate agent has been created by pi−1.
Compensating the duplicated agent must
lead again to agent ai. Otherwise, the state
of the agent at the agent destination (ai+2)
is no longer valid. Compensating transac-
tions are thus only possible if the state
of the agent is not changed on pi−1. As-
sume, for instance, that agent ai carries
$100 of electronic cash with it. If compen-
sating the stage actions on places p′i+1 and
p′i costs a penalty of $20, then the state of
agent ai on place pi−1 is now $80. However,
the agent ai+1 is not aware of this and thus
an inconsistency arises.
The degree of fault tolerance is deter-
mined by the number of copies stored
on places where the agent has previ-
ously executed. In other words, if the
agent is currently executing on place
pi, places pi−1, pi−2, . . . may store their
copy ai, ai−1, . . . , respectively, of the agent.
The higher this number, the more con-
current failures can be tolerated. For
instance, assume that copies of the
agent are stored at d predecessor places.
In this case, the MSD solution is d -
nonblocking. However, a high number
also increases the probability of duplicate
agents.
On recovery of a failed agent, we have to
distinguish between two cases: the agent
(1) has executed only partially on this
place or (2) has executed the entire stage
action and forwarded the agent to the
next place. In (1) the recovering agent
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can abort/undo the partial execution of the
stage action. Case (2) is more complex be-
cause the agent does not know whether the
forwarding has succeeded and whether it
is part of the successful mobile agent ex-
ecution. Hence, it has to wait until it re-
ceives either a commit or an abort mes-
sage. This message may arrive from its
successor if the agent has reached the
agent destination or from its predecessor if
the forwarding to the next place has failed
(e.g., from pi−1 in Figure 13).
5.3. Comparison
In the case of approaches with agent exe-
cution on multiple places (i.e., MSC, MSD,
MMC, MMD), the most important differ-
ences between committing at the agent
destination and committing at the stage
execution are (1) the lifetime of dupli-
cate agents and (2) the number of commit
decisions. The lifetime is crucial as it influ-
ences the time data items are unavailable
to other agents. The greater the lifetime,
the longer data items remain unavailable.
During this time, other mobile agents
cannot access the data items and have to
wait, which limits overall system through-
put. Committing at the stage execution
generally detects duplicates on a stage
level; their lifetime is limited to a stage
execution. In contrast, a commit at the
agent destination generally only makes
the data items available at the end of
the agent execution. Clearly, this is a dis-
advantage of the commit-at-destination
approach. At the agent destination, the
modifications of one agent are committed,
while all duplicate agents are detected
and their effects undone. Undoing and
committing agent stage actions requires
that additional messages be sent to all
places of the itinerary.
Using open local transactions (i.e., com-
pensating transactions), data items can
be accessed by other agents at the end
of the stage execution, similar to commit-
after-stage approaches. However, dupli-
cate agents become very costly, as their
stage actions have to be compensated. The
longer the lifetime of a duplicate agent, the
more costly its undoing becomes.
Another disadvantage of commit-at-
destination approaches is the need to store
copies of the agent’s state as well as code at
multiple locations. This requires a consid-
erable amount of storage. Although mobile
agents are generally small, a large num-
ber of them still imposes considerable stor-
age requirements on the places. Generally,
the copies of the mobile agent have to be
maintained until the mobile agent execu-
tion has terminated, that is, until the com-
mit/abort message has been received. In
the commit-after-stage approach, copies
of the agent are stored on the places in
Mi only during the stage Si and then
discarded.
On the other hand, committing at the
agent destination is more efficient with
respect to the number of commit deci-
sions. Whereas committing at the agent
destination requires only one commit de-
cision, committing at the stage execution
requires n−2, that is, one at all places ex-
cept agent source and destination. More-
over, agent replicas are only launched if
a failure is (potentially erroneously) de-
tected. In contrast, commit-after-stage ap-
proaches send multiple replica agents to
the next stage although no failure may
have been detected.
6. APPROACHES TO FAULT-TOLERANT
MOBILE AGENT EXECUTION
In this section, we present a survey of
existing approaches to fault-tolerant mo-
bile agents. Each approach is classified ac-
cording to the classification presented in
Section 5. First, we present commit-after-
stage approaches (Section 6.1). Wher-
ever possible, we estimate the message
complexity of a stage execution. More
specifically, we indicate the total number
of messages sent and the messages in the
critical path, that is, the messages that are
needed by the agent execution to continue.
We do not consider messages between
processes on the same machines. For these
calculations, we assume that all stages
support replication degree m (where appli-
cable) and that no infrastructure failures
occur. Commit-at-destination approaches
are discussed in Section 6.2. The results
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Table I. Classification of the Existing Approaches
Commit-after-Stage Commit-at-Destination
SSC [Walsh et al. 1998] (6.1.2), —
[Vogler et al. 1997a, 1997b] (6.1.12)
MSC [Rothermel and Strasser 1998] (6.1.11) —
MMC [Schneider 1997] (6.1.1), —
[Pleisch and Schiper 2000] (6.1.5),
[Mishra and Huang 2000] (6.1.9, SG-ARP),
[Johansen et al. 1999] (6.1.10)
SMD [Lyu and Wong 2003] (6.1.7), —
[Mishra and Huang 2000] (6.1.9, UC-ARP,
WC-ARP)
MSD — [Mohindra et al. 2000] (6.2.1),
[Silva et al. 2000] (6.2.2)
MMD [Pears et al. 2003] (6.1.3), —
[Pals et al. 2000] (6.1.4),
[Silva et al. 2000] (6.1.6),
[Dasgupta 2000] (6.1.8),
[Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin 1998] (6.1.11)
of our classification are summarized in
Table I. Table II at the end of the section
summarizes the message overhead of ap-
proaches for which sufficient information
was available.
Note that several mobile agent sys-
tems provide a mechanism to make mobile
agents persistent. This mechanism triv-
ially achieves some level of fault tolerance.
In particular, it allows a place to recover
the state and code of a mobile agent in case
of a failure and to restart the agent. How-
ever, persistence on its own is not suffi-
cient, as the modifications to the state of
the place by the failed agent need to be
undone, especially with non-idempotent
stage actions. In this survey, we thus do
not consider any further approaches that
only provide persistency and instead focus
on approaches that provide more elaborate
mechanisms.
6.1. Commit-After-Stage Approaches
We consider the following commit-after-
stage approaches: the Byzantine failures
approach [Minsky et al. 1996; Schneider
1997], Concordia [Walsh et al. 1998], the
exception handling approach [Pears et al.
2003], FANTOMAS [Pals et al. 2000],
Fatomas [Pleisch and Schiper 2000,
2000a], Lyu and Wong’s approach [Lyu
and Wong 2003], MAgNET [Dasgupta
2000], Mishra and Huang’s ARP family of
protocols [Mishra and Huang 2000], NAP
[Johansen et al. 1999], the transaction
and leader-election based approaches of
Rothermel and Strasser [1998] and Assis
Silva and Popescu-Zeletin [1998], and
Vogler et al.’s [1997a, 1997b] approach.
6.1.1. Byzantine Failures Approach. Min-
sky et al. [1996] and Schneider [1997]
propose multiple executions of the mo-
bile agent as a fundamental approach to
provide invulnerability against Byzantine
failures, more specifically against attacks
from malicious hosts on the mobile agent.
As such, their approach also addresses
nonblocking and exactly-once in the con-
text of crash failures. Clearly, as it is de-
signed to address Byzantine failures, it
is not very efficient if only crash failures
occur. Nevertheless, we present this ap-
proach here for completeness. A more de-
tailed discussion of this approach is given
in Section 9.
To achieve fault tolerance, all places
pji ∈ Mi of a stage Si execute ai and com-
mit the modifications. Although an adver-
sary may corrupt a number of agents at
a stage, this approach still allows one to
safely deduce the true result of the stage
execution if enough uncorrupted agents
are left. Hence, the exactly-once execu-
tion property is not desired in this ap-
proach. The places in Mi are indepen-
dent iso-places as defined in Section 3.2.2:
Schneider assumes replica places without
replica update mechanisms to maintain
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Table II. Message Overhead of Existing Commit-After-Stage Approaches. We Assume Replication
Degree m at All Stages and No Infrastructure Failures Nor False Suspicions
Number of Total
Msgs in Number
Critical Path of Msgs Characteristics
Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin’s 12 m+12  + 19m − 14 non-blocking
approach (6.1.11) 5m − 12
[Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin 1998]
FANTOMAS (6.1.4) 4 4 violation of
[Pals et al. 2000] exactly-once
Fatomas (6.1.5) 2 m+12  + 2 4m + non-blocking
[Pleisch and Schiper 2000] m m+12 a
Lyu and Wong’s approach (6.1.7) 4 4 blocking
[Lyu and Wong 2003]
MAgNET (6.1.8) 3n − 3i + 1 3n − 3i + 1 static itinerary
[Dasgupta 2000]
NAP (6.1.10) 1 2ma assumes reliable
[Johansen et al. 1999] failure detection
Rothermel and Strasser’s 6 m+12  − 2 8m − 4 blocking in the
approach (6.1.11) protocol implementing
[Rothermel and Strasser 1998] the commit decision
Schneider’s approach k2b m2 Byzantine
[Schneider 1997] (6.1.1) failure model
Vogler et al.’s approach (6.1.12) 2 2 blocking
[Vogler et al. 1997a, 1997b]
aAssuming a linear strategy for reliable multicast [Hadzilacos and Toueg 1994].
bk is the threshold needed to reconstruct the result in a (m, k) threshold scheme.
consistency and prevent stale data. Ac-
tually, an accurate level of consistency is
maintained by executing the agent on all
places. Schneider’s approach can be clas-
sified as an MMC approach, where the
places always unilaterally decide to com-
mit the agent replica’s modifications.
Schneider proposes an (m, k) threshold
scheme12 to correctly deduce the result
of the previous stage execution. Hence,
at each stage, k places have to receive at
least k agents of the previous stage. No
additional messages are needed for the
commit, as every place decides commit
unilaterally. As a result, k2 messages are
in the critical path. In total, m2 messages
are sent from the places at Si to the places
at Si+1.
6.1.2. The Concordia Approach. Concor-
dia provides a framework for the devel-
opment and execution of mobile agent ap-
plications [Walsh et al. 1998]. Similar to
12A (n, k) threshold scheme divides a secret into n
fragments, where only possession of at least k frag-
ments will allow the secret to be restored [Shamir
1979].
the approach in Vogler et al. [1997a] (see
Section 6.1.12), the agent is forwarded to
the next stage using transactional mes-
sage queues. Hence, Concordia uses a SSC
approach. The loss of the agent is pre-
vented by the use of a so-called persis-
tent store manager (PSM). The PSM al-
lows the agent to regularly checkpoint its
state to stable storage. After a failure,
the agent is retrieved from stable stor-
age and restarted. However, this scheme
only guarantees exactly-once for idempo-
tent operations. Indeed, the new execu-
tion of the agent may lead to different
effects.
6.1.3. The Exception Handling Approach.
Pears et al. [2003] address fault-tolerant
mobile agent execution in the particular
case where the agent execution has no
effect on the state of the places. Such
operations are idempotent with respect
to the place state. To prevent the loss of
the mobile agent, the agent source (called
home agent server in Pears et al. [2003])
monitors the agent execution and upon
detection of a crash sends a duplicate
agent.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 2004.
Fault-Tolerant and Transactional Mobile Agent Execution 239
Fig. 15. Agent ai with logger agent lai and distance 2.
The drawback of this approach is that
the agent is always executed from the be-
ginning. As a remedy, Pears et al. adopt an
approach based on a logger agent as pro-
posed in FANTOMAS [Pals et al. 2000].
The concept of a logger agent is discussed
in more detail in Section 6.1.4.
6.1.4. FANTOMAS. Pals et al. [2000]
present FANTOMAS, an MMD approach
that addresses transparent fault tolerance
for distributed and parallel applications in
cluster systems. Its fault tolerance mech-
anisms can be activated on request, ac-
cording to the needs of the agent’s task.
FANTOMAS assumes only one place fail-
ure at a time. Associated with each agent
is a so-called logger agent la, which fol-
lows the agent at distance d . For exam-
ple, if the agent executes on pi and the
logger agent is on pi−2, then d equals 2
(see Figure 15). The logger agent stores
checkpoints of the agent with which it is
associated. For this purpose, the agent pe-
riodically captures its state and sends it
to the logger agent. The agent and its log-
ger agent monitor each other and, upon
a failure of one of them, the other can be
restored from the information stored in
the surviving one. Unless more than one
place fails simultaneously, non-blocking is
achieved. Hence, FANTOMAS is 1-non-
blocking. Unfortunately, unreliable failure
detection may lead to a violation of the
exactly-once execution property. Indeed,
assume that the logger agent erroneously
detects the failure of the agent and recov-
ers it. This results in two agents and thus
in multiple executions of the agent’s code.
However, FANTOMAS addresses cluster
systems, where erroneous failure suspi-
cions can be assumed to be very rare. The
problem of network partitioning is not ad-
dressed by FANTOMAS, that is, reliable
communication is assumed. Indeed, net-
work partitions would violate the exactly-
once property if the network is partitioned
such that the logger agent is in one parti-
tion and the agent in the other.
The approach in Pals et al. [2000] is ef-
ficient and can be dynamically switched
on and off without interference of the
agent owner. Moreover, the fault tolerance
mechanisms are transparent to the agent
owner.
FANTOMAS has a very low message
complexity. Indeed, it requires that four
messages be sent per stage: one message
to send the updates to the logger agent
and one to acknowledge its reception by
the logger agent, one message to forward
the logger agent, and one message to for-
ward the agent. The number of messages
in the critical path is the same as the total
number of messages.
6.1.5. Fatomas. Pleisch and Schiper
[2000, 2001a, 2003b] present a MMC
commit-after-stage approach, called
Fault-Tolerant Mobile Agent System
(Fatomas). The redundancy illustrated
in Figure 2 enables the mobile agent
execution to proceed despite failures, that
is, it prevents blocking. However, the
algorithm that prevents blocking while
ensuring a consistent execution is not as
easy as one might guess. This is related
to the fact that Pleisch and Schiper
[2000, 2001a] assume a system model in
which failure detection is unreliable. The
solution presented in Pleisch and Schiper
[2000] consists, for all agent replicas at
stage Si, of solving the stage agreement
problem, which leads the agent replicas
to agree on:
—the place that has executed the agent,
called the primary and denoted pprimi ,
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Fig. 16. Agent execution where p02 fails. An er-
roneously suspected place p02 leads to the same
situation.
—the resulting agent ai+1, and
—Mi+1, the set of places for stage Si+1.
Hence, the fault-tolerant mobile agent
execution leads to a sequence of agree-
ment problems. Figure 16 shows an exam-
ple of a mobile agent execution spanning
four stages (S0 to S3). Note that at stage
S2, place p02 fails, which causes p
1
2 to take
over the execution. Solving an agreement
problem leads all places in M2 to agree
on p12 as the place that has executed a2.
This would be of particular importance if
p02 had been erroneously suspected by the
other places in M2.
At every stage Si (1) one (or poten-
tially multiple) of the replica agents a ji
executes the stage operation phase, then
(2) solves an agreement problem with all
replica agents of stage Si, and (3) finally
〈ai+1, Mi+1〉 is sent to the next stage.
Items (1) and (2) are performed together
as part of a variant of the consensus prob-
lem, called Deferred Initial Value Con-
sensus (DIV consensus for short) [De´fago
et al. 1998]. DIV consensus is the first
building block of the Fatomas system. In
the consensus problem, each process has
an initial value at the beginning of consen-
sus [Chandra and Toueg 1996]. Here, the
initial value at stage Si for place pji is ob-
tained by executing agent ai. Executing ai
on all the places of stage Si is not desirable
(too costly). DIV consensus allows us to de-
fer the computation of the initial value of
some place pji and only perform the com-
putation (i.e., execute the agent) when re-
quested by the DIV consensus algorithm.
For example, if p0i succeeds in computing
its initial value and does not fail, no other
place pji , j > 0, will be required to provide
(i.e., compute) an initial value. DIV con-
sensus assumes that a majority of partic-
ipants does not fail.
Finally, item (3) is an instance of the re-
liable broadcast problem. Traditional reli-
able broadcast protocols assume a 1 − m
communication scheme where one process
broadcasts a message to m destination
processes. In this case we have a r−m com-
munication schema: r senders have the
same message to reliably broadcast to m
destinations.
Fatomas is  (m−1)2 -non-blocking. Catas-
trophic failures and network partitions
may prevent progress of the mobile agent
execution (liveness). However, the exactly-
once property (safety) is always enforced.
The message complexity of Fatomas is
as follows: 2m+12 + 2 messages are in the
critical path of the fault-tolerant mobile
agent execution at a stage. Reliable for-
warding requires m+12  messages, which
are sent concurrently in the optimal case.
Overall, the stage execution and reliable
forwarding of the mobile agent requires
4m + mm+12  messages.
6.1.6. JAMES. JAMES [Silva et al.
2000] is a system that belongs to MMD.
However, it also has elements of a
commit-at-destination approach and
will be discussed in more detail in
Section 6.2.2.
6.1.7. Lyu and Wong’s Approach. Lyu and
Wong [2003] propose an SMD approach, in
which all duplicates of agent ai execute on
the same place. As a consequence, failed
places must eventually recover, but the
mobile agent execution is blocked while
the place is down. The stage actions of the
agent are executed as local transactions.
Checkpointing of the agent’s state and
logging of its operations are applied to
facilitate the recovery of a failed agent,
and to ensure exactly-once using rollback
recovery.
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The agent ai at stage Si is monitored
by a monitoring agent13 wi−1 executing at
the place of the previous stage Si−1. How-
ever, recursively, any monitoring agent wk
in turn is monitored by wk−1 executing on
place pk−1 with (k > 0). It is assumed that
the monitoring agent w0 does not fail.
Upon the recovery of a failed place pk ,
the monitoring agent wk is recovered by
wk−1. If the agent ai is suspected to have
failed, wi−1 sends a probe to pi, which,
based on the information in the log, recov-
ers the agent from the checkpoint (if the
agent has really failed), or simply stops
(if the agent has been erroneously sus-
pected). Although not explicitly mentioned
in their paper, Lyu and Wong [2003] as-
sume a shared variable on place pi to de-
tect duplicate executions. Using this ap-
proach, they are able to handle concurrent
failures of multiple monitoring agents.
In Lyu and Wong’s approach, the exe-
cution of the agent at stage Si requires
four messages: one message to forward the
agent ai+1 to the next stage, one message
to send the witness wi, and two messages
to notify wi−1 of the arrival and departure
of ai and ai+1, respectively. These four mes-
sages are also in the critical path.
6.1.8. MAgNET. The fault tolerance me-
chanisms in MAgNET are geared towards
e-commerce applications [Dasgupta 2000].
MAgNET distinguishes between failures
of agents and places, and failures of com-
munication links and machines. While the
former are handled using checkpointing
(more particularly, the persistence feature
of Aglets [Lange and Oshima 1998]), the
latter are dealt with by using the follow-
ing approach: at each stage Si in the agent
itinerary, a copy of the agent ai+1 is sent to
all remaining places pi+1, . . . , pn (i < n) in
the itinerary, which acknowledge the re-
ceipt of the agent. Place pi also retains a
copy of ai+1. In contrast to most other ap-
proaches, MAgNET does not use predeces-
13Note that monitoring agents are called witness
agents in Lyu and Wong [2003]. To avoid confu-
sion with witnesses in the context of heterogeneous
places, we use the term monitoring agent in this
article.
sor places to store replicas of the agent, but
the successor places. However, this limits
the application of the MAgNET approach
to static itineraries. Successor places that
fail to send an acknowledgment to pi are
removed from the itinerary. Agent ai+1 is
then sent again to the successor places in
the updated itinerary. Upon reception of
all acknowledgments from these places,
the execution of the agent is started on
the next place in the (updated) itinerary.
Hence, MAgNET uses a MMD approach.
Although not explicitly said in his paper,
Dasgupta [2000] seems to assume per-
fect failure detection to maintain consis-
tency. Indeed, while most duplicate agents
can be prevented because of the static
itinerary, the agent may still execute on
a place that is removed from the itinerary
because of a false suspicion.
At each stage Si (0 < i < n) of the mo-
bile agent execution, place pi sends n − i
copies of the agent to the successor places
and waits for n − i acknowledgments. Af-
ter reception of the acknowledgments, pi
sends an acknowledgment to pi−1 and a
message to pi+1 to start the execution of
ai+1. Finally, pi+1 notifies all places that
have received a copy of ai+1 that it is exe-
cuting ai+1. The total number of messages
is 3n − 3i + 1. The number of messages in
the critical path is the same.
6.1.9. Mishra and Huang’s ARP Family of Pro-
tocols. Mishra and Huang [2000] present
three protocols to ensure fault-tolerant
mobile agent execution: UC-ARP, WC-
ARP, and SG-ARP. These protocols are
based on the assumption that the agent
source never fails.
In UC-ARP, which stands for user-
controlled agent recovery protocol, the
agent leaves a monitoring agent (called
watchdog in Mishra and Huang [2000]) at
each place and checkpoints its state be-
fore moving to the next place. Failures
of the agent are detected by the agent
owner, who contacts the latest monitoring
agent in order to trigger recovery of the
agent. With unreliable failure detection,
duplicate agents may occur. Moreover, the
consistency of the place and agent state is
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not ensured. Indeed, when the agent re-
covers, its state must reflect the changes
its stage action has caused to the state of
the place. This is also referred to as output
commit property [Elnozahy 1992].
In WC-ARP, which stands for watchdog-
controlled agent recovery protocol, the task
of recovering the failed agent is left to the
monitoring agents. This protocol suffers
from the same limitations as UC-ARP. To
prevent duplicate agents, the protocol may
be forced to block upon a single infras-
tructure failure. Hence, we classify these
protocols as SMD. Note that they could
also be classified as MMD or commit-at-
destination MSD, if duplicate agents were
allowed to occur. However, no solution to
the problem of duplicate agents is given
in Mishra and Huang [2000]. This is why
we consider these protocols as SMD.
Finally, SG-ARP (server-group agent re-
covery protocol) prevents duplicate agents
and ensures place and agent state con-
sistency. SG-ARP is an MMC approach
and is based on replicated iso-places. As
in the case of Fatomas (see Section 6.1.5),
this requires that the iso-places agree on
the place that executes the mobile agent.
If (parts of) the mobile agent are exe-
cuted multiple times, then consistency of
the place state is no longer given. To our
understanding, the iso-places use passive
replication among themselves [Mishra
2001]. Hence, the agent is only executed
on one replica (called the primary) and its
updates to the place state are then applied
to the backups. The use of passive repli-
cation suggests that SG-ARP is  (m−1)2 -
non-blocking. To prevent reexecution of a
failed agent from the beginning, the mo-
bile agent and place state is periodically
checkpointed. For this purpose, all the iso-
places have access to common stable stor-
age. The execution of the mobile agent is
then continued from the last checkpoint by
another replica.
Mishra and Huang [2000] claim that
this approach enables load balancing.
However, load balancing is only possible if
two agents a and b executed on iso-places
pji and p
k
i , respectively, do not access the
same data items. Otherwise, a and b have
to be executed sequentially. Executing a
on pji and b on p
k
i in this case requires to
change primary, which is expensive.
6.1.10. NAP. NAP [Johansen et al.
1999] uses the MMC approach to
fault-tolerant mobile agent execution.
It assumes a fail-stop model, which
corresponds to a perfect failure detec-
tor [Sabel and Marzullo 1994]. Blocking
is prevented by the nature of the MMC
approach, whereas the exactly-once
execution property is ensured by the
assumption of perfect failure detector.
Hence, no agreement as proposed in
Pleisch and Schiper [2000] is required.
Rather, perfect failure detectors allow the
reliable detection of process crashes. In
particular, no process is suspected unless
it has failed, which eliminates one source
for a violation of the exactly-once execu-
tion property. Still, local transactions are
required in order to ensure at-most-once
execution on the stage actions. Unfor-
tunately, perfect failure detectors are
impossible in the Internet and therefore
NAP is only applicable in systems where
perfect failure detectors can be assumed.
Consequently, the NAP approach does not
handle link failures nor does it consider
recovery of places (see Section 2.2). The
NAP approach is (m − 1)-non-blocking,
where m is the degree of replication at a
stage.
The message complexity for NAP is 1 for
the messages in the critical path and 2m
for the total number of messages. How-
ever, this does not include the message
overhead to implement the so-called fault-
tolerant actions, that are at the basis of
NAP. A fault-tolerant action consists of the
action itself, say A, and an associated re-
covery action A¯, which is executed exactly-
once if the execution of A fails [Johansen
et al. 1999].
6.1.11. Transaction and Leader-Election-
Based Approaches
6.1.11.1. Rothermel and Strasser’s Ap-
proach. Rothermel and Strasser’s ap-
proach [Rothermel and Strasser 1998]
corresponds to MSC, which is blocking.
Indeed, a failure of the single commit
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place blocks the commit decision and
thus also the mobile agent execution. The
approach is based on transactions and
leader election. The agent is forwarded
between two consecutive stages Si and
Si+1 using transactional message queues.
More specifically, a place pji puts the agent
ai+1 into the input message queue of pki+1
as part of a global transaction. This global
transaction corresponds to the entire
stage execution at Si and encompasses
(1) getting the agent ai from the input
message queue, (2) executing the agent’s
stage action, and (3) putting the resulting
agent ai+1 into the message queue of the
places in Mi+1. Multiple places in Mi
potentially execute this transaction, but
only the leader, elected by a leader elec-
tion protocol, commits. All other places
abort the agent’s stage actions. Coupled
with the use of local transactions this
approach ensures exactly-once execution
of the mobile agent, but is unfortunately
vulnerable to blocking. This vulnerability
is caused by the use of a 2PC protocol to
atomically commit the transactions, which
is known to be blocking on a single failure
[Bernstein et al. 1987]. The reader may ar-
gue that the use of a 3-phase-commit (3PC)
[Bernstein et al. 1987] alleviates the block-
ing problem. However, blocking stems
from the combination of leader election
and transactions and the nature of MSC
and thus cannot be prevented by the use
of a 3PC. Indeed, if the orchestrator that
is managing the voting and is acting as
resource manager fails after receiving a
majority of YES votes and the 2PC or
3PC decides abort, then no new orches-
trator can reach a majority of YES votes
until the former orchestrator explicitly
resigns. This, however, can only be done
when the former orchestrator recovers
from its failure, which is a blocking
situation.
In Rothermel and Strasser’s approach,
4(m − 1) messages are needed for vot-
ing [Rothermel and Strasser 1998], and
2(m+12 −1) of them are in the critical path.
The 2PC protocol involves communication
primarily among local processes, but also
among the transactional message queues.
Indeed, sending the agent to the next stage
and the 2PC protocol require 4m messages
(4m+12  in the critical path). In summary,
6m+12  − 2 messages are in the critical
path of a stage execution. The total num-
ber of messages generated is 8m − 4.
6.1.11.2. Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin’s
Approach. Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin
[1998] improve Rothermel and Strasser’s
algorithm by overcoming some of its
limitations. In particular, to prevent
the blocking problem in Rothermel and
Strasser [1998], they use a different
leader election protocol and commit the
local transaction using a 3PC protocol
[Bernstein et al. 1987]. As a consequence,
Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin’s ap-
proach achieves m−12 -non-blocking. How-
ever, this particular combination of leader
election and transaction model may lead
to a violation of the exactly-once property.
Hence, Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin
[1998] relies on a so-called distributed con-
text database to prevent more than one
concurrent leader and thus to enforce the
exactly-once property. In summary, the
commit decision is made in collaboration
with the distributed context database, a
leader election protocol, and the 3PC. The
distributed context database runs on the
places of the stage Si. However, to our
understanding, the context database will
generally be run by another process than
the execution of the agent. Moreover, it
can be implemented as a separate service.
Consequently, we consider Assis Silva and
Popescu-Zeletin [1998] a MMD approach.
Similarly to Rothermel and Strasser
[1998], the approach in Assis Silva and
Popescu-Zeletin [1998] uses transactions
and leader election to model fault-tolerant
mobile agent execution. Combining the
two models makes it more difficult to un-
derstand the approach. Another disadvan-
tage of this approach are the rather high
maintenance costs for the distributed con-
text database, which needs to be replicated
(to provide fault tolerance).
According to Assis Silva [1999], writ-
ing a value into the distributed context
database and committing it requires 7
(m − 1) messages. In addition, forwarding
the agent to the next stage and running
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Fig. 17. Pipelined mode.
the 3PC protocol requires 5(m + m − 1)
messages. Finally, 2(m − 1) messages are
needed to notify the places of the current
stage of the termination of the stage exe-
cution. In summary, the message complex-
ity is 19m − 14. To compute the number
of messages in the critical path, we only
consider the messages from a majority of
places in the 3PC: 7(m+12  − 1) + 5(m +m+12  − 1). The termination notification
messages are not in the critical path. In
total, 5m + 12m+12  − 12 messages are in
the critical path.
6.1.12. Vogler et al.’s Approach. Vogler
et al. [1997a, 1997b] use the SSC ap-
proach. Their main focus is to ensure
exactly-once semantics for the transfer of
the agent between two consecutive places
pi and pi+1. To achieve this, pi starts
a transaction, which encompasses send-
ing the agent, storing the agent at pi+1,
initiating the agent at pi+1, and deleting
the copy of the agent at pi. A 2PC pro-
tocol is used to ensure the ACID proper-
ties of this transaction. To our understand-
ing, failures of the agent while executing
the stage action at the place are not ad-
dressed. However, the fact that a copy of
the agent is stored at the destination al-
lows to recover from a place failure and
redo the local transaction from the begin-
ning (see Section 4). This corresponds to a
checkpointing approach (see Section 5.1.1)
where a checkpoint is taken before exe-
cuting the stage action sai. Clearly, Vogler
et al.’s approach is 1-blocking, but ensures
exactly-once mobile agent execution prop-
erties provided that the stage actions run
as local transactions.
Vogler et al.’s approach needs one mes-
sage to send the agent and one message to
acknowledge its receipt.
6.1.13. Pipelined Mode. One drawback of
the approaches where multiple places
handle the execution of the stage ac-
tion (i.e., MSC, MSD, MMC, MMD) is
the need for multiple places Mi at each
stage Si. This also adds an overhead
to the communication between consecu-
tive stages. Reusing places of previous
stages for the current stage execu-
tion improves the performance and pre-
vents high messaging costs [Strasser and
Rothermel 1998; Johansen et al. 1999;
Pleisch and Schiper 2000]. Figure 17 il-
lustrates the pipelined mode with repli-
cation degree 3. At stage Si, only place
pi is given as next destination, while pi−1
and pi−2 are reused. Usually, pi−2 and pi−1
are witnesses (see Section 3.2.2) to the
execution on pi. However, iso-places and
hetero-places are also supported by the
pipelined mode, although their practical
use is limited.
6.2. Commit-At-Destination Approaches
The most prominent example of commit-
at-destination approaches is a system
called NetPebbles [Mohindra et al. 2000].
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Fig. 18. Duplicate agents caused by unreliable failure detection in the commit-
at-destination approach.
It belongs to the class of commit-at-
destination MSD approaches. The JAMES
system [Silva et al. 2000] can also be clas-
sified into this category, although it has
some elements of the commit-after-stage
MMD approach.
6.2.1. NetPebbles. The NetPebbles envi-
ronment [Mohindra et al. 2000] defines
an agent as a script that moves among
places. This script contains the code to be
executed at any place. Fault tolerance is
based on the observation that choices ex-
ist in the task to execute (i.e., the stage
actions) as well as in the location where to
execute a task (i.e., the itinerary). Based
on these choices, the script can route
around failures of both the network and
the places. Fault tolerance is achieved by
the following mechanism in NetPebbles:
As shown in Figure 13, place pi−1 keeps
a copy of ai. When it detects a failure
of agent ai on place pi, this copy is sent
to another place p′i. Monitoring the cur-
rent agent execution ai by place pi−1 of
the previous stage allows NetPebbles to
tolerate any number of sequentially occur-
ring failures to pi, p′i, p
′′
i , . . . . Indeed, as-
sume that p′i also fails. The failure of p
′
i is
eventually detected by pi−1 and a copy of
ai is also sent to another place p′′i . How-
ever, a simultaneous failure of pi and pi−1
results in the loss of the agent and thus
in a blocking execution. NetPebbles over-
comes this problem by setting up a mon-
itoring scheme where places of previous
stages monitor their successor places. Ev-
ery place sends heartbeat messages to the
previous places within a certain distance.
This distance is defined as the difference
between the indices, that is, j − k, of two
places pk and pj , ( j > k). The heartbeat
frequency decreases with increasing dis-
tance. In other words, the greater the dif-
ference between j and k, the lower the fre-
quency pj uses to send heartbeats to pk .
Place pk sends the agent ak+1 to another
place p′k+1 if and only if it suspects that all
successor places have failed, that is, if it
stops receiving heartbeat messages. This
allows NetPebbles to handle a number of
concurrent failures equivalent to the dis-
tance value. In other words, NetPebbles is
( j − k)-non-blocking.
As the places within this distance do not
solve any agreement problem, they can-
not prevent agent duplicates. NetPebbles,
however, assumes that the agent desti-
nation is the same as the agent source.
Hence, all surviving duplicate agents (in-
cluding the original agent) eventually ar-
rive at the agent destination. At this point,
the first arriving agent (either the original
or any duplicate) is committed, whereas
the actions of all others have to be aborted.
The problem of how to commit or abort the
actions of the duplicate agents is left open
in Mohindra et al. [2000].
Using closed local transactions, data
items are not available to any other agent
until the end of the agent execution, even
if the agent does not fail. Indeed, assume
that the agent executes at stage Si (see
Figure 18). Owing to a network partition
or slow communication links, place pk no
longer receives heartbeat messages from
any pj ( j > k) and thus suspects the
failure of all successor places. It sends a
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copy of the agent ak+1 to a place p′k+1,
resulting in a duplicate agent a′k+2, al-
though the original agent execution has
long passed stage Sk and is currently ex-
ecuting on pi (i > k + 2). Hence, data
items can only be liberated at the agent
destination.
6.2.2. JAMES. JAMES [Silva et al.
2000], a Java-based mobile agent infras-
tructure, is a platform that provides a
running environment for mobile agents,
with enhanced support for network
management. An agency of the JAMES
platform corresponds to a place in our
model. JAMES defines agent managers,
which act as agent source and allow
them to manage and monitor running
agents. It provides fault tolerance support
for mobile agents, but does not ensure
exactly-once agent execution. Rather,
it uses at-most-once or at-least-once
execution semantics. These semantics are
weaker than the exactly-once property
(exactly-once stage action is equivalent
to a stage action that is executed at-
least-once and at-most-once). In addition,
the mobile agent either executes on all
places of its itinerary (called atomic) or on
the maximum possible (best-effort). The
occurrence of duplicate agents is justified
for certain execution semantics, such
as best-effort agent execution and at-
least-once execution of the agent’s stage
actions. These execution semantics seem
to address the aspects of network man-
agement considered in Silva et al. [2000],
although no explicit examples are given.
When the failure of the agent currently
executing, that is, ai, is detected, the place
with the most recent copy of the agent
starts executing the agent. This place is
elected using an election protocol and gen-
erally defaults to the predecessor place
pi−1 (see Figure 13). With this approach,
blocking is prevented but agent duplicates
may occur (see Section 5.2). In JAMES,
a fault-tolerant lookup directory prevents
agent duplicates that are not caused by
network partitions. Network partitions
may disrupt the communication between
places and the lookup directory and thus
either cause blocking or duplicate agents.
The lookup directory is replicated and pro-
vides exclusive access to its methods. Ev-
ery agent ai, once it has executed the stage
action, inserts a corresponding entry into
the lookup directory. If such an entry ex-
ists already, then another agent has al-
ready executed the actions of this stage
and the current agent rolls back its stage
actions and commits suicide. Otherwise ai
sets the corresponding entry in the lookup
directory to reflect the fact that the stage
action of ai has terminated. The repli-
cated, fault-tolerant lookup directory can
be seen as the distributed commit decision
in MMD, which decides which agent to
commit (i.e., ai, a′i, . . .). This, together with
the execution of ai on potentially multiple
places (i.e., pi, p′i, . . .), shows that JAMES
has some elements of a commit-after-stage
MMD approach.
However, the lookup directory is not
sufficient to ensure the exactly-once se-
mantics. Assume that the agent currently
executes on place pi+1. Hence, the corre-
sponding entry in the lookup directory in-
dicates that the execution of ai has fin-
ished. Assume further that pi and pi+1 are
suspected by the previous places. A run
of the election protocol identifies pi−1 as
the place with the latest available state of
the agent (i.e., ai−1). To our understand-
ing, the entry in the lookup directory is
of limited use in such a case. When pi−1
sends agent ai to p′i, the place p
′
i has
two choices: (1) take into consideration
the information in the lookup directory
and discard ai, with the risk of blocking if
suspecting pi and pi+1 was accurate, or (2)
ignore the status entry and execute ai. The
latter choice leads to a duplicate agent if pi
and pi+1 have been erroneously suspected.
Duplicate agents can generally only be de-
tected at the agent destination. This prob-
lem does not seem to be addressed in Silva
et al. [2000].
The fault-tolerant, replicated lookup
directory used in Silva et al. [2000]
violates to some extent the autonomy as-
sumption of mobile agent execution. More-
over, frequent updates to the lookup direc-
tory, such as in JAMES, are costly, as all
replicas have to remain consistent.
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7. TRANSACTIONAL MOBILE AGENTS
In this section, we present approaches
for transactional mobile agents that
address infrastructure and unfavorable
outcomes and ensure atomicity of the
entire mobile agent execution. Recall,
that a transactional mobile agent is
an agent whose stage actions execute
atomically, that is, either all or none
at all (see Section 2.4). We start with a
comparison with nontransactional mobile
agents, before presenting a model for
transactional mobile agents based on
open/closed nested transactions.
7.1. Commit in Nontransactional Mobile
Agents vs. Commit in Transactional
Mobile Agents
In Section 5, we have classified non-
transactional mobile agent approaches
according to when and by whom the
commit decision of the stage action is
performed. In the context of nontransac-
tional mobile agents, the commit decision
helps to ensure the exactly-once execution
property of the mobile agent. Indeed, only
the stage action on the primary of stage
Si is committed in the commit-after-stage
approach, while the stage actions on
other places in Mi are aborted. In the
commit-at-destination approach, the
commit decision leads to the selection of
the duplicate agents arriving at the agent
destination that have to be undone. This
undo/abort occurs although the agent may
have successfully executed at all stages.
In contrast, transactional mobile agents
use the commit to ensure atomicity in the
execution of one mobile agent.
Consider, for instance, a non-
transactional mobile agent using the
commit-at-destination approach.14 The
diff erence between a commit-at-
destination approach and a transactional
mobile agent is best shown in the case
where no failures and no false suspicions
occur. In this context, a commit-at-
destination approach always successfully
executes the agent and commits the
14A similar reasoning also applies to commit-after-
stage approaches.
agent’s stage operations. On the other
hand, even with no failures and no false
suspicions, transactional mobile agents
might decide to abort the agent’s stage
operations; the success of the agent
execution does not depend exclusively
on the fact that the agent has reached
the agent destination. Rather, it also
depends on whether the stage operations
were semantically successful. Revisiting
the first example in Section 2.4, commit-
at-destination approaches commit the
agent’s stage operation (i.e., book a hotel
room and rent a car) although no flight
is available. In contrast, transactional
mobile agents either commit all three
operations or abort them all. In other
words, if no flight is available, all agent
operations will be aborted. Whereas a
commit-at-destination approach eventu-
ally commits, transactional mobile agents
can also abort. This is because commit-
at-destination approaches only need
the commit to prevent agent duplicates,
whereas transactional mobile agents use
it to address unfavorable outcomes.
Because transactional mobile agent ex-
ecutions also address unfavorable out-
comes, they have additional requirements.
Indeed, a transactional mobile agent exe-
cution is specified in terms of the ACID
properties. While in Section 4 we require
ACID properties for local transactions,
transactional mobile agents have to guar-
antee that the ACID properties encom-
pass the entire mobile agent execution,
that is, that the sequence sa0, . . . , san runs
transactionally.
7.2. Open Nested Transaction Model
A transactional mobile agent execution
can be modelled as open nested transac-
tions [Weikum and Schek 1992]. An open
nested transaction is a transaction that is
(recursively) decomposed into subtransac-
tions. Every subtransaction forms a log-
ically related subtask and can be either
open or closed. An open subtransaction
makes its results visible to other trans-
actions as soon as its computation has
successfully terminated, independent of
the outcome of its parent transaction. In
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contrast, a successful closed subtransac-
tion only makes its updates visible to other
transactions, that is, commits, if its par-
ent transaction commits. The case when
all subtransactions are closed subtrans-
actions corresponds to the (closed) nested
transactions of Moss [1985].15 Contrary to
flat transactions (i.e., nonnested transac-
tions), in open nested transactions, a par-
ent transaction can commit (provided that
its parent transactions all commit in the
case of closed subtransactions) although
some of its subtransactions may not have
been successful. In other words, some sub-
transactions may be aborted, but the par-
ent transaction still commits.
In a transactional mobile agent execu-
tion, the top-level transaction (i.e., the
transaction that has no parent) corre-
sponds to the entire transactional mobile
agent execution. The first level of sub-
transactions is composed of the stage ac-
tions sai. If replication is applied, each
stage action, in turn, can be modelled
by yet another level of subtransactions,
which correspond to the agent repli-
cas a0i , . . . , a
m
i running on the places in
Mi and executing the set of operations
op0, op1, . . . . Transactional mobile agents
are a simplification of general open nested
transactions as the subtransactions gen-
erally neither conflict nor deadlock among
themselves. Indeed, the subtransactions
a ji execute on different places and thus
run in complete isolation from each other.
To further improve the level of concur-
rency, the services running on the places
decide themselves whether to allow con-
current access to their data. For this pur-
pose, each service has a so-called com-
mutativity matrix [Rakotonirainy 1994],
which shows potential conflicts among
operations of this service and allows op-
erations that do not conflict to be exe-
cuted concurrently. The parent transac-
tion of subtransaction sa ji (i.e., sai) only
commits if exactly one of its subtransac-
tions has committed. More specifically, it
issues a commit only to one of its sub-
15See also Chrysanthis and Ramamritham [1994]
for a formal description of open and closed nested
transactions.
transactions (i.e., the primary saprimi ), and
aborts all others. The top-level transac-
tion only commits if all the subtransac-
tions sai that must succeed are ready to
commit (in the case of a closed subtrans-
action) or have already committed (open
subtransaction).
If a service request fails on one place,
the subtransaction sai can be aborted and
retried on another place without abort-
ing the top-level transaction. Assume, for
instance, that an agent ai attempts to
book a flight on Swiss International Air
Lines, but no seat is left. We do not
consider replication at the moment and
assume that no failures or false suspi-
cions occur. Consequently, the correspond-
ing subtransaction sai has an unfavor-
able outcome and is aborted. However,
the agent may move on to the Lufthansa
server and attempt to book a flight with
Lufthansa. If this subtransaction sai+1
is successful, the agent continues and
the top-level transaction can still commit.
More generally, the agent may perform a
partial rollback to pi that involves sev-
eral stages (e.g., pi+1, pi+2), and then con-
tinue the execution along an alternative
itinerary (e.g., pk , pk+1, . . .) [Strasser and
Rothermel 2000]. Note that this is fun-
damentally different from commit-after-
stage approaches, where these servers are
usually visited concurrently at the same
stage. To simplify our discussion, we as-
sume that all stage actions sai of a trans-
actional mobile agent execution must
succeed for the transaction to commit. Our
observations remain valid for the general
case, in which only a subset of the stage
actions needs to succeed.
Mobile agents can be composed of open
or closed subtransactions. A mobile agent
execution that is composed of closed
nested transactions suffers from the draw-
back that results of the stage actions are
only visible to other agents at the end
of the mobile agent execution. For long-
living agents, this has a negative impact
on the performance, as the agent has to
wait until other agents have terminated
their execution. In contrast, open nested
transactions do not suffer from this prob-
lem and are thus more suited to long-living
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agents. However, to ensure atomicity, com-
mitted subtransactions may need to be
compensated. Unfortunately, not all stage
actions can easily be compensated (see
Section 4.3), or can only be compensated at
a considerable cost. Indeed, between exe-
cuting the stage action sai and its compen-
sating transaction, another agent b can ac-
cess data items modified by sai. Executing
the compensation transaction semanti-
cally undoes the modifications performed
by sai. Agent b may have now read an in-
consistent value. Consequently, b needs to
be aborted, leading to cascading aborts.
Hence, compensatable transactions work
best in an environment where compensat-
ing transactions can be run without caus-
ing cascading aborts. This is the case for
a large number of applications (e.g., flight
reservations).
Compensation may also be unsuitable
although feasible, because of unacceptable
run-time costs. This is especially true in
environments with frequent aborts. The
use of compensation transactions makes
an abort very expensive. Moreover, all
compensation transactions must eventu-
ally commit. Consequently, failures dur-
ing the compensation transactions lead to
blocking. In contrast, an abort with closed
nested transactions is not more expensive
than a commit in the sense that the mes-
sage sent to all places contains the direc-
tive to abort instead of commit.
Hence, an ideal approach to transac-
tional mobile agent execution supports
both closed and open subtransactions. We
distinguish between blocking and non-
blocking approaches, but also indicate
whether the approach supports closed
nested transactions or open nested trans-
actions. In the following, we discuss atom-
icity in more detail in the context of trans-
actional mobile agents.
7.3. Execution Atomicity
In this section, we show how the ACID
properties, in particular atomicity and
durability (consistency and isolation are
discussed in Section 4.3), can be en-
sured for a transactional mobile agent ex-
ecution. Among the ACID properties of
Fig. 19. Abort is immediately communi-
cated to all predecessor places in the trans-
actional mobile agent execution.
the top-level transaction, atomicity and
durability16 are the hardest to achieve.
Atomicity encompasses unfavorable out-
comes (see Section 2.4) by ensuring that ei-
ther all stage actions are executed success-
fully or none of them. Note that in the case
of open nested transactions the atomicity
property is achieved if the modifications
of all stage actions are reflected [Weikum
and Schek 1992] or none at all. The lat-
ter case occurs if the modifications have
been compensated for. Hence, the atomic-
ity property is achieved on a more abstract
level than in the case of closed subtrans-
actions. To achieve atomicity, the agent a
can decide at every stage Si whether to
continue or abort the transactional mobile
agent execution, denoted Ta. If one sub-
transaction sai (i < n) has an unfavor-
able outcome, that is, not executed suc-
cessfully, Ta is immediately aborted (see
Figure 19). Otherwise, ai continues the ex-
ecution of Ta. Commit can only be decided
at the agent destination,17 when all the
saj (0 < j ≤ n) have been successfully exe-
cuted. For both commit or abort, ai reliably
multicasts the decision to all pk (k < i)
(in the case of closed subtransactions) or
sends a compensating agent in the case
of abort (open subtransactions). Similar
16Atomicity and durability are tightly coupled. As-
sume a transaction that executes write[x] and
write[y]. Assume further that the transaction com-
mits, but a crash causes the modification to y to be
lost, whereas the operation to x is made permanent.
It is difficult to say whether atomicity or durability
has been violated.
17Actually, the decision can be made on pn−1 [Pleisch
and Schiper 2001b], as the agent destination gener-
ally contains only idempotent operations and may
only be intermittently connected to the network if it
is a mobile device. For simplicity, we thus assume in
the following that the agent destination does not fail
and is always connected.
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to the case of commit-at-destination ap-
proaches (see Section 5.2), the compensat-
ing agent itinerary generally is the inverse
itinerary of the corresponding agent a.
7.4. Addressing Infrastructure Failures
Infrastructure failures do not lead to the
abort of the mobile agent execution, but
may cause blocking (while the place cur-
rently executing the mobile agent fails,
the transactional mobile agent execution
is blocked). Aborting the transaction if in-
frastructure failures occur (i.e., on pi) may
lead to a violation of the atomicity prop-
erty. Assume that the previous place pi−1
monitors the execution of the agent on
place pi. Incorrect failure detection may
cause pi−1 to suspect pi and thus to abort
the transactional mobile agent Ta. How-
ever, ai continues executing on pi and is
forwarded to pi+1. If the agent destination
decides commit, then all places pi, . . . , pn
commit the agent’s stage actions, whereas
the places p0, . . . , pi−1 have already pre-
viously aborted the stage actions. Clearly,
this is a violation of the atomicity property.
Consequently, transactional mobile agent
approaches are generally either blocking
or employ fault tolerance techniques (see
Section 5) to prevent blocking.
7.5. A Simple Approach to Ensure Atomicity
The simplest approach to ensure atomicity
is to reuse the SSD commit-at-destination
approach (see Section 5.2.1), which is
based on checkpointing. At every place,
the agent’s stage and code is checkpointed
using standard checkpointing approaches
[Gray and Reuter 1993]. Upon recovery
from a failure, the agent’s execution is
continued from the previous checkpoint.
The local transactions are only committed
when the agent reaches the agent destina-
tion, i.e., it uses the model of closed nested
transactions [Moss 1985]. Messages are
sent to all previous places p1, . . . , pn−1 to
commit the local transactions. Note that
the stage action sa0 does not have to be
committed, as we assume that they are
outside the scope of the transactional mo-
bile agent execution. The transactional
mobile agent execution is immediately
aborted if an unfavorable outcome occurs
that renders any further execution obso-
lete. For instance, if the agent owner only
flies with Swiss International Air Lines,
but Swiss International Air Lines does not
have any seats available for the required
destination, the agent execution can be
immediately aborted.
8. APPROACHES TO TRANSACTIONAL
MOBILE AGENTS
In this section, we present a survey of ap-
proaches to transactional mobile agent ex-
ecutions. We classify the approaches into
blocking and non-blocking solutions.
8.1. Blocking Solutions
8.1.1. Assis Silva and Krause’s Approach.
Assis Silva and Krause [1997] pro-
vide a model of transactional mobile
agents that corresponds essentially to the
checkpointing approach discussed in Sec-
tion 7.5. However, their model assumes
open subtransactions.
8.1.2. Sher et al.’s Approach. Sher et al.
[2001] present an approach to transac-
tional mobile agents. It is based on the
commit-at-destination SSD approach and
ensures the ACID properties on the entire
mobile agent execution. However, block-
ing is inherent in any SSD approach
and Sher et al. [2001] suffers from this
problem. The probability of blocking is re-
laxed by allowing parallel transactions to
run over different parts of the itinerary
that are combined again using so-called
mediators, which govern how the paral-
lel transactions are processed further. For
instance, the mediator ANDjoin dictates
that all parallel transactions have to ar-
rive, whereas with XORjoin, only one has
to arrive. Figure 20 depicts the example of
an XORjoin mediator. The transactional
mobile agent execution of a splits into
two parallel transactions represented by
agents b and c. For instance, bi−1 tries to
book a flight with Swiss, while ci−1 books
a flight with Delta Airlines. At stage Si,
the mediator XORjoin keeps only one of
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 2004.
Fault-Tolerant and Transactional Mobile Agent Execution 251
Fig. 20. Mediators (rectangles) allow the execution of parallel transactions.
the subtransactions (represented by ci and
bi), while the other is aborted. The agent
a then continues to reserve a hotel room
at stage Si+1. The places that run a join
mediator (i.e., pi) must be visited by the
partial mobile agents executing in paral-
lel. This generally limits the itinerary to a
(partially) static itinerary. Moreover, fail-
ures to non-parallel transactions and me-
diators result in blocking of the execution.
Eliminating nonparallel transactions thus
prevents blocking, that is, a split medi-
ator resides at the agent source and a
join mediator at the agent destination.
The entire mobile agent execution then
runs as parallel transactions. However, ex-
ecuting parallel transactions from which
only one is committed at the end, even
if no failure occurs, causes considerable
overhead.
8.1.3. Strasser and Rothermel’s Approach.
Strasser and Rothermel [2000] address
the issue of partial rollbacks to a save-
point in a mobile agent execution. If this
savepoint is located at S0, then their ap-
proach ensures atomicity on the entire mo-
bile agent execution. Strasser and Rother-
mel’s approach is based on the protocol in
Rothermel and Strasser [1998]. Hence, the
transactional mobile agent execution may
block if the coordinator of the 2PC fails
during the forward execution of the trans-
actional mobile agent (see Section 6.1.11).
As open subtransactions and thus com-
pensating transactions are used, only the
resources of a stage execution are unavail-
able; resources of other stages are still
available to other transactional mobile
agents. The use of compensation transac-
tions limits the applicability but improves
the performance by making the accessed
resources available again immediately af-
ter the stage execution. However, compen-
sating transactions may not be suitable in
an environment with frequent aborts of
transactional mobile agents, that is, with
frequent unfavorable outcomes. The issue
of closed subtransactions is not addressed
in Strasser and Rothermel [2000].
Blocking may occur in the execution of
the compensating transactions. As a con-
sequence, partial rollback involving the
rollback of more than the current stage
execution may block, thus blocking the en-
tire mobile agent execution.
8.2. Nonblocking Solutions
8.2.1. Extending NetPebbles. The ap-
proach in Mohindra et al. [2000] (see
Section 6.2) could be extended directly
into a transactional mobile agent ap-
proach, although this is not done by the
authors. This can be done by having
a XORJoin mediator (see Section 8.1)
running at the agent destination. The
approach in Mohindra et al. [2000] uses
the MSD commit-at-destination solu-
tion, and thus is non-blocking unless
the agent destination fails. Instead of a
priori executing parallel transactions to
avoid blocking [Sher et al. 2001], parallel
transactions are started only if a failure is
detected. Hence, if no failures occur or are
detected, no parallel transactions occur.
8.2.2. Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin’s
Approach. The approach presented by
Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin [2000]
and Assis Silva [1999] also builds
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transaction support on top of fault-
tolerant mobile agent execution. For this
purpose, Assis Silva and Popescu-Zeletin
[2000] reuses the approach in Assis Silva
and Popescu-Zeletin [1998]. Assis Silva
and Popescu-Zeletin’s approach uses the
model of open nested transactions and
thus relies on compensatable transac-
tions. In Assis Silva [1999], the author
mentions that his approach also supports
closed subtransactions, although no
details are given.
8.2.3. TranSuMa. Pleisch and Schiper
[2003, 2003a] suggest an approach, called
TranSuMa, to nonblocking transactional
mobile agents based on their approach to
fault-tolerant mobile agents [Pleisch and
Schiper 2000]. This approach can sup-
port open nested transactions that consist
of both open and closed subtransactions
[Pleisch 2002]. In the case of closed sub-
transactions, instead of immediately com-
mitting the operations on the primary of
stage Si the local transaction is kept un-
terminated. If a subsequent stage action
sak aborts, all the predecessing local trans-
actions sa j ( j < k) are also aborted. On
the other hand, if all stage actions succeed,
then the local transactions are only com-
mitted when the agent reaches the desti-
nation. All other places pji = pprimi imme-
diately abort the local transactions they
may have (partially) executed. On the pri-
mary, the agent leaves a so-called station-
ary agent, which awaits either an abort or
a commit message. On reception of such a
message, it either aborts or commits the
operations of the local transaction corre-
sponding to the message. The other ACID
properties are achieved using the usual
mechanisms.
9. MOBILE AGENT EXECUTION UNDER A
BYZANTINE FAILURES MODEL
In the previous sections, we have only con-
sidered crash failures, that is, machines,
places, and agents simply stop executing.
With crash failures, the principle issues
that need to be resolved are blocking and
exactly-once execution. In this section, we
generalize the failure model to also accom-
modate Byzantine failures. More specifi-
cally, failing components behave arbitrar-
ily and can, for instance, send arbitrary
message to other components. Byzantine
failures thus introduce additional issues
to the mobile agent execution that need
to be resolved. Moreover, malicious places
can tamper with the code or internal state
of the agent and thus modify the agent be-
havior. Consequently, the agent may be-
have differently than originally defined by
the agent owner, which may lead to a (po-
tentially financial) disadvantage for the
agent owner.
In this survey, we focus on fault tol-
erance in the mobile agent execution
and thus we are concerned with attacks
of malicious components on a mobile
agent. Such attacks can be initiated by
malicious places or other malicious agents.
As this survey considers single agent ex-
ecutions (see Section 2.1), we do not ad-
dress attacks by malicious agents here.
Indeed, these attacks can be prevented us-
ing mechanisms also applied in traditional
distributed systems. Such mechanisms
are, for instance, authentication, which
aims at making sure a client (or agent)
is who he claims to be, and authoriza-
tion, which grants access to resources to an
authenticated client (agent). Authentica-
tion and authorization are also important
mechanisms to prevent attacks on a place
by a malicious agent. Such attacks are
addressed by most of the existing mobile
agent platforms (e.g., Gray [1996], Karjoth
et al. [1997], Peine [1998], Gray et al.
[1998], and Herrmann and Zapf [2000]),
but are outside the scope of this survey.
The interested reader is also referred to
the work in Fritzinger and Mueller [1996],
Lee and Necula [1997], Necula [1997], and
Rubin and Greer [1998] for further ex-
amples of how to cope with such attacks.
Moreover, we do not consider the prob-
lem of denial-of-service attacks. Finally,
we assume that the agent is protected
while it is in transit between two authenti-
cated places, which can be achieved using
standard mechanisms (e.g., Secure Socket
Layer [Freier et al. 1996]).
Note that in a traditional client/server
system the security issues are well known
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and adequate solutions exist [Pfleeger and
Cooper 1997]. The clients and servers are
generally grouped into an administrative
domain with a set of registered users.
In addition, the client is executed on the
user’s machine. Since client and server
run in the same administrative domain,
a user trusts a server or can at least prove
that it has received incorrect results. The
security in a mobile code environment can-
not rely on this trust relationship between
the server and an agent because they are
generally not part of the same administra-
tive domain.
9.1. The Problem of Protecting the Agent
from Malicious Places
The problem of protecting the agent from
malicious places is caused by fact that the
code of the agent is executed in an un-
trusted environment [Chess et al. 1995;
Farmer et al. 1996a; Minsky et al. 1996].
Without protection of the agent, the execu-
tion environment (i.e., the place) can alter
or destroy the agent’s code and the data ac-
cumulated during its itinerary. Moreover,
the agent may contain confidential data
such as credit card information, which
should only be accessible by the place if
the agent intends to perform a purchase.
For instance, consider an agent that books
the cheapest flight to New York. After vis-
iting several airline places it arrives at a
malicious place of a airline X . Airline X
accesses the prior offers the agent has col-
lected and becomes aware that its price of-
fer is not the lowest. As a consequence, it
is tempted to modify or simply delete the
collected prices of the other airline’s offers
such that its price becomes the lowest. It
is also already an unfair advantage for a
server to be able to read the current state
of the mobile agent. This would allow it to
learn about the offers of other airlines and
thus adapt its pricing policy accordingly.
Hence, the agent’s code and data needs to
be protected.
In order to protect a mobile agent, the
following properties are required:
—Privacy: A place can only access the data
that the agent wants to divulge.
—Integrity: The data and the code of the
mobile agent are protected from tam-
pering, or, at least, tampering can be
detected.
Integrity for the immutable parts of the
mobile agent, including its code, (or rather
a hash of it) can be easily verified by using
digital signatures (e.g., RSA public keys
[Rivest et al. 1978]) [Chess et al. 1995]. In-
deed, most existing mobile agent systems
provide this kind of protection. Privacy for
the immutable data of the agent requires
a public key infrastructure, whereby the
private parts of the agent are encrypted
with the public key of target place. How-
ever, this limits the agent execution to
(partially) static itineraries.
In the following, we first present
replication-based approaches. Here, we
also revisit the approach of Minsky
et al. [1996] and Schneider [1997] (see
Section 6.1.1), which we call privilege-
based approach and which achieves non-
blocking mobile agent execution even with
Byzantine failures. Then, we show con-
cepts to protect the state of the mobile
agent from a malicious host, which gener-
ally are orthogonal to the approaches for
fault-tolerant mobile agent execution dis-
cussed in Section 5.
9.2. Replication-Based Approaches
In this section, we present two approaches
that attempt to provide Byzantine fault-
tolerant mobile agent execution using
replication.
9.2.1. Privilege-Based Approach. We have
already shown how the approach in
Minsky et al. [1996] and Schneider [1997]
achieves fault tolerance in the context of
crash failures in Section 6.1.1. However,
Minsky et al. and Schneider also consider
Byzantine failures, more specifically at-
tacks from malicious hosts on the mo-
bile agent. Using the MMC approach, all
places pji ∈ Mi of a stage Si execute agent
ai. Although an adversary may corrupt
a number of agents at a stage, this ap-
proach still allows a place at stage Si+1 to
safely deduce the true result of the agent
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execution at stage Si if enough uncor-
rupted agents are left.
To protect the mobile agent from mali-
cious hosts the agent is sent to all places of
the next stage Si+1 by every place of stage
Si. Every place at stage Si+1 takes as input
the majority of the inputs that it receives
from stage i. At this point, the places in
Mi+1 have to know the places in Mi; oth-
erwise, malicious places could simply pro-
duce a majority of bogus agents and send
them to the places in Mi+1. The agents
thus have to carry a privilege. Corrupted
agents can then be identified and deleted.
In Schneider [1997], two protocols are pro-
posed to implement such privileges; both
require at each stage that a majority of
places in Mi are nonfaulty.
—(Shared secret). These protocols ensure
that only the source and the destina-
tion can learn a secret. Suppose we have
a system where each stage has 2k − 1
places. Each stage i thus divides the se-
cret into 2k−1 fragments using a (2k−1,
k) threshold scheme. Each fragment is
then sent to a different place of Mi+1. To
reconstruct the secret, a node needs at
least k fragments of it.
—(Authentication chains). In this scheme
all agents carry unforgeable certificates
describing their itineraries. Whereas
only a place p can construct the certifi-
cate, if nonfaulty, any place can check
its validity. Every place uses sender au-
thentication to reject corrupted agents
and selects any agent for which it re-
ceived equivalent replicas from a major-
ity of the places of the previous stage.
The privilege-based approaches prevent
malicious places from inserting faulty re-
sults into an agent’s execution. However,
additional mechanisms, such as encryp-
tion, have to be integrated to ensure agent
privacy.
Moreover, these approaches make the
rather strong assumption that the repli-
cated places fail independently. While this
assumption is adequate if only crash fail-
ures occur, it is much stronger with Byzan-
tine failures. Clearly, if all servers are ex-
act replicas, then a successful attack on
one of the servers may easily also be suc-
cessful on the replicas of these server.
Hence, an attacker may compromise all
replicas of a particular server.
9.2.2. Comparing the Results of Two Agent
Replicas. Yee [1999] uses agent replica-
tion to address the particular case of a sin-
gle malicious place in an agent’s itinerary.
Assume, for instance, that mobile agent a
is to find the minimal airfare for a par-
ticular flight. Hence, agent a visits the
sequence of places p0, p1, . . . , pn = p0.
A replica agent a′ is created, which vis-
its the places in the inverse order, that
is, pn, pn−1, . . . , p0. By comparing the re-
sults of these two agent replicas, the agent
owner can determine the true minimal air-
fare, unless the malicious place is the one
offering the minimal airfare. In this case,
Yee’s approach only achieves second best
pricing. With this approach, violations to
the integrity of the mobile agent can be de-
tected. Clearly, this approach only works
for a very limited set of applications and
assumes only one malicious place in an
agent’s itinerary. Moreover, the itinerary
must be statically known when the agent
is instantiated.
9.3. Tamper-Proof Environments
A solution for protecting both the privacy
and the integrity of the agent is based
on a tamper-proof environment (TPE)
[Wilhelm et al. 1999; Yee 1999]. Indeed,
the TPE actively prevents tampering with
the mobile agent, while most of the other
approaches only allow to detect a violation
to the agent’s integrity. It can be seen as a
hardware blackbox, which provides a well-
defined, restricted interface to the outside
environment as well as an execution en-
vironment for agents inside the blackbox.
The restricted interface does not allow the
place to inspect or tamper with an agent’s
code and data inside the blackbox from the
outside. The agent has to trust a TPE, or
rather the TPE’s manufacturer, which is
usually not the same company as the ser-
vice provider of the place. During trans-
mission, the agent is encrypted with the
public key of the TPE and therefore cannot
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be accessed by the place itself. Rather, it is
forwarded to the TPE, which decrypts it
using its private key and finally starts to
execute the agent code. The interactions
between the agent and the local environ-
ment or other agents are also handled by
the TPE.
Security is based on the agent owner’s
trust towards the TPE manufacturer. The
latter is believed not to provide malicious
TPEs because of its business interests.
Clearly, the TPE manufacturer would be
out of business instantly if somebody could
prove that it delivered a malicious TPE or
that its TPE is not secure from tampering
(e.g., by malicious agents executed by it).
As the use of TPEs incurs considerable
organizational and financial overhead we
believe that its application will be limited
to particularly security-sensitive domains
(e.g., banks, stock market). To reduce the
size of the TPE only the crucial parts of the
agent, such as the certificates or the keys,
are kept in the TPE, instead of accommo-
dating the entire agent. Smartcards are
an example of such a resource-constrained
but low-cost TPE [Fu¨nfrocken 1999]. Such
TPE’s are also used in Karjoth [2000] in
the context of distributed marketplaces.
To avoid the cost of TPE’s, the ap-
proach in Algesheimer et al. [2001] re-
places the TPE by a generic secure compu-
tation service that is accessed by all places.
The secure computation service can ex-
ecute small parts of an agent applica-
tion while maintaining privacy. For larger
applications, the associated costs become
prohibitive.
9.4. Achieving Forward Integrity of Partial
Results
Several approaches address the issue of
protecting the data that the agent has
accumulated prior to executing on place
pi, that is, the results of its execution
on places p0, . . . , pi−1. This property is
called forward integrity. To prevent mali-
cious hosts from modifying earlier results,
a so-called chain [Karjoth et al. 1998]
needs to be established. Using this chain,
the tampering of prior results can be de-
tected. However, these approaches gen-
erally have the limitation that cooperat-
ing malicious agents or a malicious agent
that is visited at least twice by the mo-
bile agent can truncate the chain of re-
sults. Indeed, assume that agent a visits
the places p0, p1, . . . , pk , pi, . . . , pj , pk , . . .
and that pk is malicious. Place pk could
remove all the results that have been con-
tributed by the places pi to pj .
9.4.1. Yee’s Approach. Yee [1999] was
the first to devise protocols for achiev-
ing forward integrity in mobile agent ex-
ecutions. His protocol is based on hash-
ing and digital signatures. However, the
protocol cannot prevent a malicious place
from modifying its prior offer, or the offer
of a colluding malicious place. Moreover,
Yee’s protocol needs to have a priori knowl-
edge about the length of the itinerary in
order to detect removed results.
9.4.2. KAG Family of Protocols. Karjoth
et al. [1998] improve the approaches in
Yee [1999] in such a way that disallows a
place to modify its own earlier offer later
again. They suggest several algorithms
for protecting the results of free-roaming
agents. These algorithms allow to detect
the tampering of the agent’s results. How-
ever, two cooperating malicious hosts can
still remove the results of the places be-
tween them from the agent without being
detected.
Whereas one class of algorithms is based
on a per-server digital signature scheme,
another uses hash chains. In the per-
server digital signature scheme the result
of a stage’s computation is encrypted us-
ing the public key of the agent author-
ity. Then, place pi signs this encrypted re-
sult and forwards it to pi+1. In order to
detect the removal of results, some ran-
dom number is encrypted along with the
result of the computation. In addition, a
hash value over the result at pi−1 and the
ID of pi+1 chains the different stages to-
gether. Changing the order of encryption
and signing allows the identity of the pre-
vious places to be hidden. This scheme re-
lies on the availability of a public-key in-
frastructure.
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In contrast to the digital signature
schemes, the hash chain algorithms in
Karjoth et al. [1998] do not rely on a pub-
lic key infrastructure. They are based on
forwarding a value in addition to the en-
crypted result to the next place. This value
can be a hash value containing the compu-
tation’s result, a random number, the pre-
vious hash value to build the chain, and
the ID of pi+1.
9.4.3. Approach in the Ajanta Mobile Agent
System. Ajanta is a Java-based mobile
agent system [Karnik and Tripathi 1999].
It provides abstractions such as read-only
agent state and append-only logs. The
read-only agent state corresponds to the
immutable part of the agent state and can
be protected using digital signatures (see
Section 9.1).
The append-only log allows a place to
add new objects and ensures that any sub-
sequent modifications to these objects can
be detected by the agent owner. The imple-
mentation of append-only logs uses an en-
crypted checksum. The initial value of this
checksum is based on some random num-
ber, generated and kept secret on the agent
source. On every place pi on which a new
object is appended, the new checksum con-
sists of the concatenation of the following
elements, encrypted with the public key of
the agent source:
(1) the previous checksum,
(2) the signature of the new object, and
(3) the ID of the signer of the new object.
9.4.4. Multi-Hops Protocol. Corradi et al.
[1999] propose a protocol similar to the
append-only log. As the chaining relation,
they use a message integrity code, which
contains the previous message integrity
code, the data modified at the current
place, an additional nonce, and the iden-
tity of the next place.
9.4.5. Roth’s Attacks. Roth [2001a] has
devised an attack that breaks the proto-
cols in Karjoth et al. [1998], Karnik and
Tripathi [1999], and Corradi et al. [1999].
The basic idea is for a malicious node
to abuse a legitimate node as an oracle
that decrypts, signs, or computes proto-
col data on behalf of the malicious host.
To improve the robustness of these proto-
cols, Roth introduces the notion of mobile
agent kernel that identifies a particular
instance of a mobile agent [Roth 2001b].
Using the mobile agent kernel, the abuse
of nonmalicious places as oracles can be
prevented.
9.5. Encrypted Functions
Sander and Tschudin [1998] suggest com-
puting with encrypted functions to achieve
software-based agent privacy and in-
tegrity. Assume that an agent knows how
to compute f and requires f (x) from a
service located at place pi, but wants to
keep f a secret. The agent owner there-
fore transforms (encrypts) f to some other
function E( f ) that hides f and may also
produce encrypted output data. P (E( f ))
describes the program that implements
E( f ) and is sent to pi. Therefore, pi only
learns about P (E( f )), which it applies to
its input data x. The result P (E( f ))(x) is
sent back to the agent, which decrypts it
and obtains f (x).
While in Sander and Tschudin [1998]
only polynomial and rational functions are
supported, Sander et al. [1999] and Cachin
et al. [2000] extend this support to non-
interactive evaluation of functions that
can be represented by circuits of logarith-
mic depth and arbitrary functions, that
can be mapped to polynomial-size circuits,
respectively.
9.6. Cryptographic Traces
Vigna [1998a] proposes cryptographic
traces to detect illegal modifications of an
agent’s code, state, and execution. During
the execution of the agent, data, called
traces, is collected that allows the agent
owner to verify the execution of the agent
at the agent destination.
While Vigna’s approach can detect cer-
tain misbehavings of places, it cannot
detect all of them. For instance, it can-
not detect whether additional side-effects
have occurred at a place, as it only takes
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 2004.
Fault-Tolerant and Transactional Mobile Agent Execution 257
the state of the agent into account. As-
sume, for instance, that the agent moves
money from account A to account B. The
state of the agent may not reflect this
transfer. Also, a malicious place may fab-
ricate a trace that fits the state of the
agent resulting from a completely differ-
ent execution.
Moreover, the approach relies on a
trusted third party and does not offer pro-
tection against disclosure of data.
9.7. State Appraisal
Farmer et al. [1996a] propose a mecha-
nism called state appraisal to verify the
integrity of the mobile agent’s state. State
appraisal functions are defined at the
agent source and allow to verify invariants
in the agent’s state. Clearly, the applica-
bility of state appraisal is limited, as the
invalid state needs to be foreseen at the
agent source. In general, it is not possi-
ble to indicate the precise state the agent
will eventually have, in particular with dy-
namic itineraries.
9.8. Code and State Obfuscation
Hohl [1997] proposes an approach that is
based on code and state obfuscation. The
mobile agent’s code and state is obfuscated
in a way that makes it difficult and time
consuming for a place to find out about pri-
vate data of the mobile agent, while still
allowing the agent to execute properly. To
limit the time a place has to try to find out
about the agent’s private data, each agent
is given a time-to-live. Once its time-to-
live is expired, the agent is not accepted
any more by a legitimate place.
Unfortunately, it is not always easy to
predict an appropriate time-to-live that
both gives the agent time to execute and
limits the time a malicious place has to
break the agents obfuscation mechanism.
On one hand, a small time-to-live may pre-
vent the agent from finishing its execu-
tion, even with the absence of malicious
places. On the other hand, obfuscation can
still be broken if sufficient time is avail-
able. Also, if a malicious place wants to
read the state of the agent, it can still do
it, as it can keep the agent as long as it
wants, thereby ignoring the time-to-live
parameter. As a consequence, privacy can-
not be ensured with this approach. How-
ever, a place can detect tampering when
the tampering has lead to the expiration
of the time to live.
9.9. Agent Security Based on the Itinerary
or the Use of Child Agents
A certain degree of security can be
achieved by carefully choosing the
itinerary of a mobile agent. Indeed, if the
agent periodically returns to a trusted
place, the damage done by malicious
places can be limited. Also, child agents
can be used to visit untrusted places.
In Gypsy [Jazayeri and Lugmayr 2000],
a company runs a number of secure
places in the network. The original agent,
called supervisor agent, only visits these
trusted places. If it needs to visit an
untrusted place, it sends a child agent,
called worker, which executes on the
untrusted place and sends its results
back to the supervisor agent. Using this
approach limits the damage that can be
done by a malicious place.
10. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a com-
prehensive survey on fault-tolerant and
transactional mobile agent execution. The
survey has discussed these properties
with respect to crash failures of machines,
places, and agents and Byzantine failures
of places. To our knowledge, our work is
the first to present a comprehensive sur-
vey on fault-tolerant and transactional
mobile agent execution. Although other
surveys exists, they do not consider the
latest work or only address security is-
sues. Note also that several of the concepts
presented in the survey have similari-
ties with techniques used in traditional
client/server computing (without mobile
agents). However, an in-depth discussion
of similarities and differences cannot be
provided within the scope of the survey.
In the context of non-transactional
mobile agents, we have presented a novel
classification of fault-tolerant mobile
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agent approaches. We have first dis-
tinguished between commit-after-stage
approaches, where the stage actions are
committed immediately after the stage
execution, and commit-at-destination
approaches, where the stage actions are
only committed at the agent destina-
tion. Within these approaches, we have
further classified solutions according to
the following characteristics: (1) whether
the agent is executed by a single or
multiple places, (2) at which point in
time the modifications of the mobile
agent are committed, and (3) whether
commit decision and stage execution are
collocated. This leads to various solutions,
which have been discussed in terms of
their advantages and usability. Moreover,
our classification allows the discussion
of strengths and limitations of these
solutions solely based on the characteris-
tics (1) to (3). Approaches that replicate
the mobile agent (i.e., approaches MSC,
MMC, MSD, MMD) generally have higher
resource costs and a greater message
overhead. Moreover, approaches based
on iso-places require the service provider
to provide replicated places. However,
they have the clear advantage to be non-
blocking. In contrast, SSC approaches
are less complex but may block upon the
failure of a place.
Besides infrastructure failures, transac-
tional mobile agents also address unfa-
vorable outcomes of the agent execution
at a place. We have presented a survey
of transactional mobile agents. A general
solution to transactional mobile agents
should support open and closed nested
transactions. Generally, blocking is less of
a problem in the case of open nested trans-
action. Indeed, it only increases potential
dependencies with other mobile agents.
In contrast, blocking in the case of closed
nested transactions seriously limits over-
all systems throughput and affects also
places that may not be directly involved
in the blocking.
The article also surveys approaches that
protect the mobile agent from malicious
hosts. While some of the approaches build
on concepts that are also applied to crash
failures (e.g., replication), most of the ap-
proaches use concepts that are orthogo-
nal to the ones used for crash failures.
Protecting mobile agents from malicious
places is a difficult problem [Farmer et al.
1996b]. The only comprehensive security
is provided by TPEs. TPEs ensure both pri-
vacy and integrity. However, TPEs require
additional hardware and also impose an
organizational overhead. The other ap-
proaches provide partial mechanisms that
address particular security aspects. En-
crypted functions seem to be another pos-
sible approach, but they are too limited
to be of general use. All other approaches
make limiting assumptions or only ad-
dress agent integrity. However, these ap-
proaches may be adequate for applica-
tions and in environments that comply
with the assumptions underlying the ap-
proaches. This shows that protecting the
agent from attacks is an issue that still
is not adequately solved and is still sub-
ject to ongoing research. It is not clear at
this point, whether software-based com-
prehensive security can be provided at all
[Chess et al. 1995; Farmer et al. 1996b]. As
a consequence, nearly all existing mobile
agent systems only address the protection
of places and mobile agents against mali-
cious mobile agents, and ensure integrity
of the immutable parts of a mobile agent.
The survey shows that the research
on fault tolerance and security in the
context of mobile agents has made sub-
stantial progress in recent years. Many
different approaches have been devised,
with different strengths and weaknesses.
These approaches vary in terms of mes-
sage overhead and resource consumption.
As applications have different require-
ments to fault tolerance, transactional ex-
ecution, and security, the approaches best
suited for a given application need to be
carefully chosen. Some applications can
trade blocking against reduced message
overhead and resource consumption, and
thus achieve better performance. Others
have severe requirements with respect to
non-blocking and are ready to accept a per-
formance overhead. It is the application
developer’s responsibility to choose the ap-
propriate approach. This survey can help
him with this task.
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Despite recent advances, much work
still needs to be done. Both fault-tolerant
non-transactional and transactional mo-
bile agent systems have to prove their
value in real applications. Not all of the
presented approaches have been imple-
mented yet and have been quantitatively
evaluated in a practical setting. Quantita-
tive evaluations, however, are needed in
order to further understand the advan-
tages and limitations of the various ap-
proaches and to complement/confirm our
results. Moreover, as some approaches are
very complex and their correct application
requires extensive theoretical knowledge
and experience, they are not easily used by
application developers. Hence, good and
self-explaining user interfaces and well-
defined frameworks need to be provided
to facilitate the utilization of these ap-
proaches and to limit the potential of
mistakes.
Although recently mobile agent technol-
ogy has also found its way outside the aca-
demic community, its applications are still
not very wide-spread. With more research
into fault-tolerant, transactional, and se-
cure mobile agent execution, the develop-
ment of mobile agent-based applications
can be furthered.
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